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MICHAEL T. MALONEY, ROBERT E. MCCORMICK, &
RAYMOND D. SAUER*

On Stranded Cost Recovery in the
Deregulation of the U.S. Electric Power
Industry
Deregulation of the United States electric power industry has
enormous potential to reduce the rates which consumers pay for electricity.1
Two facts about current electricity prices make this obvious. First, the
average price paid for electric power is significantly higher than the long
run average cost of production. Second, price differences that exist between
markets have nothing to do with the current costs of supplying power and
everything to do with the exclusive rights granted to power companies
under the current regulatory regime. Deregulation of electric utilities can
unleash strong competitive forces. If left unfettered, competition will reduce
regional price variation and lower price towards cost.
The price declines expected under deregulation will reduce the
profits of electric utilities that receive high prices for their output. For some
firms the financial repercussions will be serious. In light of this, some
industry interest groups and economists have argued that, while
deregulation may be desirable, electric utilities must be shielded from its
financial implications. Specifically, it is argued that utilities should be
compensated for what has come to be called stranded costs.
The term "stranded costs" is a new entrant on the economic scene,
emerging as an issue only in the context of electricity deregulation. At
bottom, the concept refers to an investment made under regulation whose
value will not be recovered under prices determined in a deregulated
environment. This would seem to be a general condition associated with
deregulation of an industry. It is thus odd that little or no attention was paid
to stranded costs in the discussions on airline deregulation, trucking
deregulation, and the breakup of AT&T. 2 An anecdote from the telephony
industry illustrates the point. In the early and middle 1970s, MCI and AT&T
invested substantial sums in the installation of microwave towers. The

* We can be contacted at (864) 656-3430, 656-3441, 656-3969 or maloney@clemson.edu,
sixmile@clemson.edu, or sauerr@clemson.edu. The fax number is 656-0948. We acknowledge the
assistance of Chad McGowan, Elvino Mendonca, Laura Speake, and Emily B. Wood.
1. This is the major conclusion of our monograph, MICHAEL T. MALONEY, et al.,
CIzENS
FOR A SOUND ECONOMY FOUNDATION, CUSrOMER CHOIcE, CoNSUMER VALUE: AN ANALYSIS OF
RrmiLCOMPEDON IN AMERuCA's ELECTRIC INDUsTRY (1996). This monograph is the basis and
background of the analysis and conclusions we present here.
2. The divestiture of AT&T was an antitrust case, not a legislative mandate. Hence, it is
not exactly comparable to deregulation in airlines, trucking, and electricity.
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value of these towers was virtually destroyed by technological advances in
fiber optic cable and deregulation of the long-distance telephone market.
Indeed, Sprint showed footage in its television advertisements of
microwave towers being dynamited. Yet there was no effort to obtain
recovery for the lost value of stranded towers when the FCC deregulated
the long-distance market.
Why the issue appears now and not in the first cases of
deregulation is an interesting question, but one we leave unanswered here.
Even so, the fact that there is little intellectual history of stranded cost
recovery is revealing. Indeed, the main issues are ones of equity and
morality, not economics and efficiency. While some analysts have tried to
make stranded costs into an economic issue, their arguments do not bear
close scrutiny as we demonstrate below.
In this paper we address the following issues. First, we provide an
operational definition of stranded costs. We use this definition along with
empirical evidence from financial markets to estimate the magnitude of
stranded costs. We then briefly examine the history of electricity producers
in financial difficulty. Finally, we discuss what economics has to say about
the consequences of compensating and the means of compensation for
stranded costs. Does de-regulation threaten the nation's ability to efficiently
produce electricity? Provided that compensation does not get in the way,
the economics of stranded costs indicates that the answer is no.
1.

A Functional Definition of Stranded Costs

In the extreme, stranded costs could be defined as any investment
that will be less valuable under competition than under regulation. Hence,
any decline in the value of assets in the move from regulation to
competition would be cause for reimbursement. Public policy has not
viewed the problem in this light. Two academic writers who have argued
that utilities should be allowed stranded cost recovery define these stranded
costs as "those costs that the utilities are currently permitted to recover
through their rates but whose recovery may be impeded or prevented by
the advent of competition."3 We choose a definition that is slightly more
functional. To us, the proper measurement of stranded costs compares the
value of all the firm's utility assets in the regulated environment with the
value of these same assets in competition.
In the regulated regime, investor-owned public utilities are allowed
to make a "fair" rate of return on prudently invested capital. In practice,

3. William J. Baumol & J.Gregory Sidak, Stranded Cost Recovery: Fairand Reasonable,
PUBLIC UTILITIM FORTNIGHTLY May 15, 1995 at 20. See also BAUMOL & SIDAK. TMANSMISSION

PmCING AND STRANDED COSS N Tm EUCTRC POWR INDUSrMY, (1995).
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regulators set the price of electricity so that the utility receives enough
income to pay its expenses plus a return of its fixed investments. In effect
then, historical or accounting costs of installation determine the current
market value of capital. Regulators adjust the revenue stream up or down
to insure that public utility operators earn the approved rate of return on
the book value of capital.
Under competition, a firm builds a plant on the expectation of
future income and cash flow. The hope of this future stream of income
motivates the investment. Once the physical capital is in place, and
assuming that it has no alternative or salvage value, its economic value is
determined by the future cash flows. A simple example will help to
elucidate the principle.
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF VALUATION
Suppose a firm is contemplating the construction of a facility. The
firm expects that it can generate $100,000 per month of gross sales using this
facility. Labor, materials, taxes and other inputs are expected to cost $75,000
per month to operate the facility. This leaves the firm with $25,000 of net
cash flows after all its operating bills are paid. If the underlying capital
investment will have no alternative uses once in place, its capital or market
value is the present discounted value of $25,000 per month as far into the
future as the situation is expected to exist. For purposes of the example, let's
assume that the facility and the sales and costs are expected to continue for
10 years, 120 periods. If the appropriate discount rate on these cash flows
is 12 percent per year or 1 percent per month, then the market value of this
capital in place is given by the formula:
1_"
20 ($100,000-$75,000)_

V=Ei-1

(1+0.01)y

-,i o($25,000)-I7453

(1 +0.01)i

17253

The decision to build the plant is transparent in this simple
example. If the firm can construct the plant for less than $1.74 million
dollars then it is a good investment, that is, a positive net present value
project. The cash outlays on capital to construct the plant, if they are less
than $1.74 million, are dominated by the expected value of the future net
cash flows. If the firm makes the investment, under this scenano, the equity
value of the firm will increase by the differential between the cash outlays
on construction and the present value of the future expected net cash flows.
Assume that the plant can be built for $1 million. What is this plant
worth? There are two basic ways to answer this question. One is to place a
historical value on the costs of putting the asset in place. Call this the
historical cost accounting method. The cost accounting method says that the

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

value of the plant is the accounting dollar cost of building the facility.
Accordingly the plant is worth, and is carried on the books of the company,
as $1 million of assets.
Alternatively, there is the discounted cash flow or net present value
approach. This valuation approach is based on the idea of efficient capital
markets. It asks, what could the asset be sold for? Since the value of the
expected net cash flows is $1.74 million, economic theory argues that in an
this
efficient capital market a buyer can be found who will pay this sum.
4 In
world, the plant is worth its market value, which is $1.74 million.
Let's take this scenario down the road five years. First, assume that
the cash flows have accrued at the expected rate and that there is no change
in expectations about the gross income or costs over the remaining five year
life of the facility. Second, assume that based on the appropriate accounting
rules the facility has been depreciated linearly at an annual rate of 10
percent over the 10 year life. What is the plant now worth?
In accounting terms, the plant is worth its original cost of $1 million
minus its depreciation, which is five times 10 percent or 50 percent. The
current value of the plant for accounting purposes is $500,000. However, in
value terms the plant is worth the net present value of the future cash flows.
There are five years left of production where the facility produces a net
income of $25,000 per month. The present value of $25,000 a month for five
years at a discount rate of one percent per month is:
V=F,' ($25000)
(I +0.01)' =$1,123,876.
At the end of five years, the net present value of the expected future
cash flows is $1.12 million. In sum, the accounting approach says that the
plant is now worth $500,000 and the valuation approach says that the plant
is worth $1.12 million.
To understand the nature of stranded costs, now imagine that the
expected revenues from the plant fall dramatically. Suppose the output of
the plant declines significantly in price. Adjusting for this price change, the
gross revenues fall $75,000 per month. Costs also fall but not as much;
assume they are now $70,000.' The net cash flow to this enterprise is now
$5,000 per month instead of the original $25,000. The present value of this

4. In more elaborate valuation analysis things like taxes, working capital requirements
and capital structure are included. We abstract from these here in the interest of simplicity and
because they do not affect our conclusions.
5. Costs are lower because the plant produces less output and hence less labor and

materials are used.

Winter 1997]

STRANDED COST RECOVERY

sum for the remaining five years is $224,775.
The plant which originally cost $1 million to build and which is
being carried on the accounting books as having a value of $500,000 is now
only worth $224,775 in the marketplace. The market value of the plant has
plummeted because the price of its output has gone down.
THE VALUATION OF STRANDED COSTS
Having gone through this exercise, we are now in position to be
precise about the definition of stranded costs. Consider Table 1 where the
pre-ceding discussion is depicted and stranded costs are computed. The
stranded costs are computed as the difference between the current market
value of the asset in its productive employment and the historical cost of the
asset depreciated through time using the approved accounting depreciation
schedule. Because the product has a lower price than anticipated, cash flows
are lower. Lower cash flows mean lower fair market value. The fair market
value of the asset is now less than its accounting or book value. Its market
value is now $224,775.6 On the books its appears to be worth $500,000, so it
appears that the owners have lost $275,224. These are the true stranded
costs.
In an unregulated environment, this capital value loss is borne by
the owners of the business. The market value of the company declines from
$1,123,786 to $224,775. Based on market valuation, they lose $899,101. Their
wealth is lower, but nothing else changes. By construction, the plant has no
alternative use and no salvage value. The opportunity cost of using the
facility in its present use is therefore zero. Any income generated in excess
of the variable operating costs accrues to the owners of the business. The
owners, although they are now poorer, are better off running the plant than
idling it. This is also revealed in the last two rows of Table 1.
If the business is abandoned at any point in the ten-year period, the
company has no equity or market value. If, at the five year point, the
original revenue estimates hold and the facility is operated, then the equity
value is $1,123,786. If, at the five year point the new revenue stream exists
and the facility continues to operate, then the equity value is $224,775.
Under any scenario, the company is worth more money if it continues to
operate the facility.
An important distinction is created. Financial losses are one matter,
continued viability and operation of an enterprise another. Stranded costs
can never be so large as to force the shutdown of a business. So long as the

6. It is important to recognize that we have built this scenario upon the assumption that
the capital has no alternative uses nor any salvage value. It is worthless for any purpose except
the production for which it was built.
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capital value of the business is positive, it pays the owners to operate the
facility. Said another way, so long as gross revenues exceed current
operating costs, it pays the owner to operate. To repeat, no facility will be
abandoned or idled because of its sunk or stranded costs. At least that is the
conclusion of basic economics and the modem theory of finance.
Table 1 shows the calculation of stranded costs based on the
difference between the fair market value of assets and their accounting or
book value. This same methodology can be applied to the U.S. electric
power industry. However, before we estimate stranded costs for the electric
power industry let us take note of the first and most important point
concerning stranded costs: Stranded costs are not stranded productive
facilities. As is dearly revealed by the foregoing analysis, stranded costs are
an accounting and financial issue, not a production question. Capital in
place with no alternative economic use will be productively employed so
long as the price received for its output is at least as large as its marginal
operating cost.
2. The Magnitude of Stranded Costs: Evidence from the Financial
Markets
At the end of 1994, the book value of the firms in the electric power
industry was around $400 billion. This is comprised of the historical cost of
physical capital net of depreciation. This is the equivalent of the $500,000
number in the example in Table 1. In the real world, book value is
complicated by capital structure that includes debt and preferred stock in
addition to common equity. Book value of equity in investor-owned utilities
was $188 billion in 1994, long-term debt was $183 billion, and preferred
stock made up the difference. At that point in time, the market value of
common stock in the industry was $210 billion. The ratio of the market
value of equity to its book value was 1.12:1. Unlike the example in Table 1,
this says that for the investor-owned portion of the electric industry taken
as a whole the difference between market value and book value is positive.
This suggests that for the industry taken as a whole there are no stranded
costs. On the whole, the market value of the assets in place exceeds its
accounting or book value.
Table 2 reports the market to book ratios for various investorowned utilities for 1993 through 1995. Using the most recent data, there are
but seven firms with equity values less than their book values. These are
Centerior Energy, Central Maine Power, Central Vermont PSC, Entergy
Corp, Long Island Lighting, NY State Elec. & Gas, and Niagara Mohawk.
To reiterate the argument we presented in the context of Table 1,
true stranded costs are the fair market value of a firm's assets minus their
historical, depreciated book value. If the book value is greater than the fair
market value, then the firm has true stranded costs. If the fair market value
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is greater than book value, then the firm has no true stranded costs. In the
electric power industry, the book value of assets (for equity holders) is $188
billion. To determine the value of true stranded costs, we need an estimate
of the value of assets in the electric power industry as they would be priced
if the electric power market were fully competitive. While the current stock
market valuation of equity in the electric power industry is not itself an
estimate of the industry's fair market value in competition, it does contain
information about that valuation and about the level of true stranded costs
in the industry.
By all accounts, the financial community became keenly aware of
the immediate possibility of deregulation and competitive pricing in the
electric utility industry during 1994. The equity value of the investor-owned
electric utility firms declined significantly in 1994. From a high in 1993 of
$282 billion, the equity value of the utility portfolio fell to $212 billion at the
end of 1994. The cumulative return over this period was around minus
twenty-five percent, market adjusted. The ratio of market equity value to
book equity value fell from 1.39:1 to 1.12:1. However, in spite of this decline
in market equity, which can be reasonably related to a market perception
of declining prices of electricity into the future, the market value of equity
was still higher than the book value for the industry as a whole.
We have examined the stock market reaction to several news stories
during this period.7 On at least two occasions, news stories directly related
to competition in electric power were met with sharp declines in the stock
prices of investor-owned public utilities. These events are striking because
of the near universal decline in industry stock prices in spite of the fact that
these events related directly to only a couple of utilities.
During this period there were several significant event periods.
Over a four day period, November 1-4, 1993, the portfolio of investorowned electric utilities lost a cumulative 5.5 percent. 8 This period is
centered on an announcement by Moody's that it had downgraded the
credit rating on fifty of the top electric utilities because of the looming threat
of competition. Over the month of February, 1994, the portfolio was down
4.7 percent. During this month, the Wall Street Journal carried a story

7. Event analysis uses stock market and financial data to assess the impact that investors
incorporate into their perception of future events. The technique is widely used in finance and
economics. For an example of the methodology, see Michael T. Maloney & Robert E.
McCormick, A PositiveTheory of EnvironmentalQuality Regulation, J.LAW & ECON., Apr. 1982, at
99.
8. We used a simple market model to adjust the portfolio returns. We regressed the daily
electric utility value-weighted portfolio return on the value-weighted market return over the
period January 1,1990, through May 31, 1993. The estimated portfolio beta over this period was
.52. Estimates are based on data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices,
University of Chicago.
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describing the battle between two of California's largest utilities (SCE Corp
and San Diego Gas & Electric Co.) and a number of independent power
producers (IPPs).9 Finally, in the first half of the month of May, the portfolio
lost 9 percent. Much of this loss occurred simultaneously with two stories
published by the Wall Street Journal. The first story, May 9, described the
attempt by Las Cruces, NM, to "bypass" its utility (El Paso Electric Co) in
favor of cheaper power on the wholesale market. The Journal reported this
as a "test" of legality of wholesale wheeling and as "a warm up for a
deregulatory trend that could easily spread across the US, bringing an
onslaught of competition which could bankrupt some utilities."' The
second story, on May 11, was a follow-up describing analysts' reports
saying that electric utilities were a bad buy in the stock market because of
the threat of deregulation.1 In all, 20 points of the 25 percent decline in the
equity value of the electric utility portfolio over the eighteen month period
occurred contemporaneously with press reports detailing the potential
threat of competition in the industry.
Throughout 1995 the stock market continued to react to news of
deregulation in the industry and to economy-wide and world-wide events
that implied changes in the cash flows of electric utilities. Overall, stock
prices in the electric utility industry rose in 1995 by nearly as much as they
fell in 1994. However, this did not occur uniformly across the industry. The
stock price of some firms fell in 1995. Notably, Niagara Mohawk had an
equity value decline of 25 percent in 1994 and 58 percent in 1995 for a twoyear return of -68 percent. On the other hand, some firms regained in 1995
all that they had lost in 1994 and more. For instance, the Southern Company
only lost four percent in 1994 and gained 21 percent in 1995. There has been
substantial diversity in the stock price movements of the firms in the electric
utility industry since the advent of competitive pricing initiatives. This
diversity is understandable because the effects of competition will not be
evenly distributed across the industry.
It is interesting to compare the electric utility industry to the market
over this period. At the end of 1993, the equity value of the electric power
industry was $262 billion compared to the total equity value of stocks in the
United States of $5.01 trillion." Electric power was 5.2 percent of total

9. Andy Pasztor, Who Will Make ElectricPower in California?,WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 17,1994, at

I1.
10. Caleb Solomon, As Competition Roils Electric Utilities, They Look to New Mexico, WALL
ST. J., May 9,1994, at Al.
11. Warren Getler & Dave Kansas, Stock Buys by Utility Industry InsidersMay Have Been
Misguided,Analysts Say, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1994, at C1.

12. This measure of the equity value of securities in the United States economy includes
stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX and stocks traded on the NASDAQ, as reported by the
Center for Research in Security Prices, University of Chicago,
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equity value. By the end of 1994, equity value in electric power had slipped
to $212 billion as had the market, which had fallen to $4.98 trillion. Electric
power at the end of 1994 made up 4.25 percent of equity value in the U.S.
economy, and the slight decline in the value of stocks from 1993 to 1994 was
smaller than the decline in the equity value of the electric power industry.
Arguably, the stock market's response to the news events of
deregulation is muted. In other words, the stock market is valuing the
common equity of investor-owned utilities based on a chance of
deregulation, but the chance is less than one. Until an event like
deregulation is actually completed there is always some chance that it will
change in form or be completely abandoned. The expectation of different
possible outcomes has to be accounted for in the prices of the financial
securities. From the perspective of the researcher or analyst, it is difficult to
assess precisely the subjective probabilities employed by the financial
market in arriving at the current stock price. However, there are certain
principles that apply.
First, the current stock price is an estimate of the fair market value
of the firm in competition, the value of any non-utility assets, and the
probability of the recovery of stranded costs either by explicit payment or
by delaying the move to competition.' In a regulated environment, the firm
is allowed to collect revenues above operating costs to pay off its invested
capital with an approved rate of return. Assets that are productive but fully
depreciated recover only their operating costs. Under regulation, the firm's
equity value should equal its book value. In a competitive regime, the fair
market value of the firm depends on the cash flows produced by the firm's
assets as in Table 1. Some fully depreciated assets, worth essentially nothing
to stock holders in a regulated environment, are worth substantial amounts
in competition because their operating costs are below the price of output.
In the move to competition, the firm's equity value can be either above or
below its book value depending on the net cash flows provided by its
assets.
In addition, the firm's current equity value includes the possibility
that in the move to competition, regulators will allow the firm something
extra, something in addition to a pat on the back as the firm walks out the
door into the world of competition. There is the chance that regulators will
allow the firm to recover part, all, or even more than the firm's true
stranded costs (where true stranded costs are the difference between the fair
market value of its assets and their book value). Most observers seem to
think that regulators will allow partial but not full recovery of stranded

13. As a practical matter, regulators charged with computing stranded costs using this
technique should adjust the market value of equity by the fair market value of non-utility assets
such as excess cash, earnings retained in land, and other holdings.
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costs. In the extreme, if the financial market feels that there will be no
stranded cost recovery, then the current stock price is equal to the fair
market value of the firm's assets in competition. If the financial market
believes that full recovery of true stranded costs but no excess recovery will
occur, then the current stock price can be no larger than book value if there
are true stranded costs. Finally, if the financial market feels that firms will
get more than true stranded costs, then the current stock price can be larger
than book even if the fair market value of the firm is less than book.
If the financial market expects that there will be a recovery of
stranded costs based only on the difference between the fair market value
of the assets of the utility in a competitive regime and their undepreciated
book value, then the current stock price is an unbiased forecast of whether
stranded costs exist. Under this assumption, stranded costs only exist if fair
market value is less than book. If price is below book value, the market is
predicting that the fair market value of the firm's assets in competition is
worth less than book. If the financial market expects that there will be
nothing more than the recovery of true stranded costs, then only firms with
current market-to-book ratios less than one have any true stranded costs.
We formalize this problem as follows: Let V stand for the current
market value of the firm's common equity, FMV stand for the fair market
value of the equity holders' claims to the firm's assets when competition
emerges, SCR stand for stranded costs recovered, TSC stand for true
stranded costs, B stand for the book value of assets, and p stand for the
probability of stranded costs recovery. Then
V=FMV+p.SCR,
where
SCR = {TSC, ..., B).
In words, the current market value of the firm is equal to its fair
market value plus the probability of the recovery of stranded costs times the
amount that will be recovered. The amount of stranded costs that will be
recovered can itself vary from the minimum value of only true stranded
costs up to full book value without any deduction for the fair market value
of the firm's assets.
If the market is guessing that firms will get no recovery of stranded
costs (p = 0), then the current stock price is equal to the fair market value of
the assets in competition. However, it is most likely that the market thinks
that these firms will get something. In fact, the market has to expect them
to get something because they are getting something now. As long as
regulation continues and deregulation is postponed, firms are recovering
stranded costs, some excess and some true.
The fact that the market reacted so significantly to deregulation
events in 1994 suggests that the market recognizes that many firms are
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getting paid prices in excess of long-run marginal cost. The stock price
declines occasioned by the announcement of deregulation implies that the
output prices enjoyed by electric utilities under regulation are higher than
the output price that will be generated by a competitive market in
equilibrium. That firms are currently receiving output price in excess of the
anticipated competitive equilibrium price means that output price is greater
than the minimum average cost of production. The conclusion is that firms
are receiving stranded cost recovery now.
This is not an earth-shaking deduction. The whole notion of
stranded cost recovery is based on the obvious fact that regulation is
allowing firms to charge prices that do not reflect the cost of providing the
product they sell to their customers. However, the subtlety of the issue is
that delay in deregulation is a form of stranded cost recovery. Part of what
the market impounds in the p term in our formula is the recovery of
stranded costs by delay in the move to competition. Moreover, delay in
deregulation provides for stranded cost recovery that is quite possibly in
excess of true stranded costs. Regulation is allowing firms to receive prices
in excess of cost. Some of this goes to the recovery of invested capital that
has a book value greater than its fair market value, but some may simply
support excess profit. To the extent that competition is postponed, utilities
will continue to recover stranded costs, some of which is true stranded costs
and some that may be excess.
In order to use our formula to make some projections about the
magnitude of true stranded costs, we must make some assumptions. These
assumptions can be grouped into scenarios about financial market beliefs
regarding the probability and magnitude of stranded cost recovery.
Consider the following:
1) Stranded Cost Recovery will equal True Stranded Costs
a) Probability p determined by lowest priced firm, or
b) Probability p set equal to one.
2) Stranded Cost Recovery greater than True Stranded Costs
a) SCR = Book Value of Common Equity with p determined by
lowest priced firm, or
b) SCR = Book Value of Common Equity with larger p.
In the first scenario, we investigate the implication that the market
is pricing utility stock based on the assumption that stranded cost recovery
will be no larger than true stranded costs and that this pricing is based on
the probability of the weakest firm in the industry recovering its stranded
costs. The weakest firm is Niagara Mohawk, which at the end of 1995 had
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a market-to-book ratio of .39, the lowest in the industry. If Niagara Mohawk
is expected to have no equity value in a competitive regime, that is, if it will
go bankrupt without some recovery of stranded costs, then its equity value
is entirely based on the possibility of the recovery of stranded costs. Its 1995
year end equity value of $983 million is based on the expectation that it will
be allowed to recover some stranded costs. If its fair market value is zero,
then the market to book ratio is the financial market's forecast of the
probability of the recovery of stranded costs, that is, 39 percent.
If we use this as the expectation of the probability of stranded costs
recovery across the industry, we can calculate the financial market's
estimate of stranded costs based on the assumption that firms will not be
allowed to recover more than true stranded costs. If the financial market
thinks that only true stranded costs will be recovered, then only the firms
with market to book ratios less than one have stranded costs. From this
analysis we have stranded costs as follows: Centerior, $1.2 billion; Central
Maine Power, $28 million; Central Vermont PSC, $365 million; Entergy,
$321 million; Long Island Lighting, $563 million; N.Y. State E & G, $171
million; and Niagara Mohawk, $2.5 billion. 4 The total financial market
estimate of stranded costs across these seven firms is $5.1 billion, and using
the market to book definition of true stranded costs, none of the other firms
in the industry has any stranded costs.
This is not a very big number compared to the amount of stranded
costs estimated by others. s Maybe it is small because we have set an
artificial boundary of zero on the Fair Market Value of the assets of Niagara
Mohawk. Even so, it is important to recognize that if the market is
anticipating recovery of stranded costs that does not exceed the value of
true stranded costs, then the only firms with true stranded costs are those
with market values of equity below their book values. This means that the
maximum value of true stranded costs for equity holders in the electric
utility industry is the sum of the book value of equity for the seven firms
listed above. In our formula this is equivalent to assuming that the
probability of stranded cost recovery is one. This gives a total of $21 billion,
which is the sum of the book values of all firms with market-to-book ratios
less than one as shown in Table 2.
Our second scenario posits that the financial market thinks that
utilities will get more than true stranded costs. If utilities are allowed to get
more than the book value of their assets minus the fair market value of
them, then the current equity value can be larger than book value even

14. These figures are derived from Table 2.
15. See, e.g., LeSn BAXTER &ERIc Husr, OAK RiwcE NATIONAL LABORATORY, Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, EsrniA

UTMMnES (1995).
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though true stranded costs exist. For instance, if utilities are paid the full
book value of their assets as stranded costs, which is around $188 billion,
and if they get to keep their assets, which are still valuable in a free market,
even though they have been paid off, then the current stock price will
include the excessive stranded cost recovery plus the fair market value of
the assets. The stock market valuation will include the fair market value of
assets plus the expectation of excessive stranded cost recovery. If this is
true, that is, if the financial market thinks that some firms will be able to
recover more than their true stranded costs, we can still draw an estimate
of the true stranded costs. It depends on the expectation of the probability
of excessive stranded cost recovery and on the extent of excess.
As a first pass, let's use our original estimate of the probability of
the recovery of stranded costs based on Niagara Mohawk and assume that
the market thinks that, given this probability, the amount that firms recover
is as large as the full book value of their assets. Our estimate, under the
assumption that there will be excessive stranded cost recovery, is that true
stranded costs are around $21 billion."' At the same time, excessive stranded
cost recovery is $47 billion. Using these assumptions there are thirty-five
firms that have true stranded costs. Some of the additional firms are
Consolidated Edison, Northeast Utilities, Pacific Gas & Electric, and Edison
International, to name a few. The additional firms with true stranded costs
have market to book ratios slightly higher than one, but true stranded costs
are confined to firms with market to book ratios not far from one.
As we increase the hypothesized probability of recovery of
excessive stranded costs, our estimate of the value of true stranded costs
increases, but so too does our estimate of excessive stranded cost recovery.
So, for instance, if we set p at .61, our estimate of true stranded cost is $42
billion. At the same time, this implies an excess stranded cost recovery of
$64 billion, which sums to a total stranded cost recovery of $106 billion, a
number not far off from the stranded cost claims of the industry. Indeed, if
we set p at .9999, the model says that true stranded costs are slightly less
than $100 billion and excess stranded cost recovery is over $70 billion. In the
case of excessive stranded cost recovery, p is inversely related to the
probability that competition will eventually come to the industry. That is,
as p goes up, competition is delayed. Our priors are that investors are
expecting competition to eventually come because of the way they
precipitously reacted to news events in 1993 and 1994. Even so, the financial
community seems to be saying that competition is not likely to be just

16. This figure is the same as the number generated in the last scenario by coincidence
only. As above, this figure can be derived from the data present in Table 2. Specifically, the
market value of equity in 1995 and the book to market ratio can be used to derive the book
value in 1995. The probability of stranded cost recovery assumed in this scenario is .39.
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around the comer. In the final analysis, the financial market seems to be
saying, in spite of the rhetoric, the true value of stranded costs is not very
high while the potential for excessive stranded cost recovery is substantial.
Obviously, our stock market analysis is incomplete because the
value of stranded cost recovery varies based on the choice of the value of p,
the probability of stranded cost recovery. Without an independent measure
of p our model can generate a wide range of numbers for true stranded
costs. Even so, there is one direct conclusion: The stock market is saying that
the value of true stranded costs cannot be larger than $100 billion, and if it
is this high, excess stranded cost recovery will be very large.
While our stock market analysis fails to speak precisely on the
question of the value of true stranded cost, we have another method at our
disposal. It is the direct estimation of the fair market value of utility assets
based on forecast cash flows in a competitive regime. We develop this
analysis in a moment. Interestingly, cash flow analysis gives an estimated
value of true stranded cost of $42 billion. Combining this estimate of true
stranded costs with the stock market analysis implies that the market is
predicting a .61 probability of stranded cost recovery and with it an
associated $64 billion value of excessive stranded cost recovery.
DEBT AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS
It must be noted that we are not factoring long-term debt into this
analysis. It may be the case that the current equity value of these firms is
based on some expectation that in bankruptcy the old equity holders will
not lose everything. It is true that the bankruptcy process commonly
produces this result.17 Nevertheless, historically, the returns to old equity
holders going through bankruptcy have not been large. Bankruptcy value
is a tiny portion of the current equity value of the electric utility industry.
It is easy to get confused about bankruptcy and financial distress.
In and of itself, bankruptcy is a financial outcome. The wealth of the old
equity owners is exhausted, and the debt holders usually recover less than
full value. However, the physical capital and labor pool is neither destroyed
nor directly affected by the financial reorganization. Later in this article we
discuss several bankruptcies that have already occurred in the electricity
industry. It is enlightening to forecast the effects of the possible bankruptcy
of a few firms due to deregulation from the experience of the firms that
have already gone through it due to other causes. The fact that the old
equity holders lose substantially all of the wealth they had invested in the

17. See Katherine Daigle & Michael T. Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency
7any Explanation,J. LAW &EcON., Apr. 1994 at 157, for a review of the law, references, and an
analysis of the outcome of the bankruptcy process.
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assets has no bearing on the productivity of the women, men, and machines
comprising the operating unit. Whatever the inputs could do before
bankruptcy, they can still do afterwards. Bankruptcy does not change the
stock of human or physical capital. The few bankruptcies that may occur
due to deregulation will likely allow efficient reorganizations that make for
smoother operations in the future.
This is the focal point of our analysis. The debate surrounding
stranded costs tends to obscure important economic issues. The assets of the
electric power industry are not idled by the fact that the movement to
competition makes some firms less valuable in a financial sense.
Independent of the recovery of stranded costs, in a competitive market for
electricity, the fair market value of productive assets will be determined by
the difference between market price and production cost. If market price is
larger than average production cost for an asset, then it will be employed.
It will have market value, quite possibly market value in excess of its book
value. But regardless of whether its fair market value is larger or smaller
than its book value, it will be productively employed.
OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE STRANDED-COSTS PUZZLE
There is a second category of stranded costs. Many utilities have
contracted to buy power at rates that are higher than the forecasts of prices
under competition. These purchase power contracts, whether voluntary or
mandatory, are analytically identical to the physical capital problem just
described. The contracts mandate a minimum amount of power to be
purchased at a pre-specified price. The capital value of these contracts rises
and falls with the price of electricity.
For example suppose a power company has a contract to buy one
million kwh of electricity per year for the next ten years from some supplier
at a price of 12 cents per kwh. Let the current price of power be 12 cents.
Then this contract has no economic value. The spot price of power and the
long-term contract price are identical.18 Now imagine that the spot price of
electricity increases to 13 cents per kwh. Then the rights to purchase power
at lower than market rates have positive capital value to the buyer. The
present discounted value of the difference between the spot and contract
prices times the allowed quantity over the life of the contract is the capital
value of the contract.
The value of the contract becomes negative to the buyer (the electric
utility) if the spot price or the expected spot price declines below the
contract price. The present value of the difference between the contract

18. This simple approach ignores any option value imbedded in the long-term, fixed price
contract.
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price and the current price, times the required purchase volume will be the
change in capital values accruing to firms with these purchase contracts
outstanding. Firms with large volume purchase contracts at prices higher
than anticipated under competition will sustain value losses when the price
declines from its current regulated levels. This price decline is a second
source of stranded costs.
It is noteworthy that the bulk of the contracts with high purchase
prices and negative capital values appeared as a result of PURPA of 1978,
and they are most prevalent in New York and California where public
utilities were required by regulators to enter into these contracts for
purchase. In the current system, utilities are allowed to charge rates that are
sufficient to pay the costs of their purchased power as an operation expense.
In a world of freely competitive prices, rates will become unrelated to these
pre-existing long-term purchased power contracts. The negative capitalized
value of these contracts can be called a stranded cost. 9
CASH FLOW ANALYSIS OF FAIR MARKET VALUE
An alternative approach to the measurement of stranded costs is to
calculate the fair market value of utility assets directly. Using this approach
we estimate the net cash flows to the firms based on their costs of
production and the competitive market price of electricity. In order to do
this, we first look at prices and costs across companies.
Price and cost data are available for investor owned utilities from
FERC Form 1 (available from the Energy Information Administration of the
U.S. Department of Energy--DOE-EIA). Information on price and average
operation and maintenance cost is given in Table 3 in 1994. There are 98 utilities
listed in this table. These are the utilities for which we have stock market and
financial information that is matched to the data collected by DOE. °
Even a cursory review of the data reveals that price varies widely.
This is not surprising; it is because customers are paying such a wide
variety of prices that there is a call for competition. The highest priced
utility shown in Table 3 is Long Island Lighting. Its average revenue from
all sales is 15 cents/kwh. Other New York utilities are high also. New York
State Electric & Gas is the lowest of the utilities from its state at 8
cents/kwh. Other northeast utilities are also high. California is another state
with utilities that charge high prices. Pacific Gas & Electric collects 10.5

19. Throughout our analysis we assume that the existing PURPA contracts perpetuate and
are not violated by legislation or court rulings. We are not proposing that these contracts be
nullified. We have not analyzed the details of these contracts and the firms that produce power

under them.
20. Hawaiian Electric Industries is excluded because it is not interconnected.
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cents/kwh; Edison International (formerly So. Calif. Edison) gets 10
cents/kwh; and Enova (formerly San Diego Gas & Electric) charges 9.4
cents/kwh.
On the other end of the distribution, there are four firms that have
average revenues from all sales below 4 cents/kwh. These are at the bottom
of Table 3. One is Idaho Power which has a large amount of hydro-electric
production. However, two others are American Electric Power and KU
Energy which are large coal-fired generators in the West Virginia-Kentucky
coal fields.
Costs are also shown in Table 3 and are also distributed widely
across utilities. Total production costs including production, purchased
power, transmission, distribution, customer accounts, and general
administration vary from 7.7 cents/kwh to 2.1 cents/kwh. As expected,
given rate of return regulation, the high priced companies are also the high
cost companies and vice versa. The lowest cost producer is Idaho Power.
KU Energy and AEP are also down near the bottom. At the top, many of the
highest priced electricity sellers have costs in excess of 6 cents/kwh.
Even though there is a strong correlation between price and cost,
the allocation of cost across categories is revealing. Price is strongly
correlated with the average cost of total production. The simple correlation
coefficient is .83. It is also strongly correlated with fuel cost from steam
generation presumably because of fuel adjustment clauses. Even so, price
is not significantly related to the average total production costs of
conventional steam generation nor the average production costs of nuclear
generation. That is, at the production level, there is not the strong link
between cost and price that we see at the aggregated level. This makes sense
when we think about the process of rate regulation. Regulators allow for
revenues to be set high enough to cover operating costs plus a recovery of
investment. Prices vary across companies based on the extent to which their
facilities are depreciated. Variation in the extent of depreciation breaks the
correlation between operating costs and price.
Note that 92 out of the 98 investor-owned utilities in Table 3 have
average operating and maintenance cost for their steam generating facilities
that is less than 4 cents/kwh. Of course, average cost is based on current
production levels, and current production is characterized by a lot of down
time and idled capacity.
The major conclusion that we developed in earlier work is that competition will cause price to fall because it will allow firms to expand
production of underutilized facilities and sell this power by discounting its
price.2' The extent of output expansion depends on expansion of
production, which in turn depends on capacity utilization. We assume that

21. See MALONEY, et. al., supra note 1.
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output will be able to expand by the amount of extra generation available
from running existing conventional steam generation full time. For each
utility we compute extra generation by calculating how much more steam
generation it could achieve if its capacity utilization went up to the capacity
utilization level reported by NERC for steam generators when they are
running. In our earlier work we estimated the potential expansion of the
system using NERC data and found that capacity utilization for
conventional steam facilities could increase from its current level of around
52 percent to 71.6 percent by running them during what are now their idle
or reserve hours.' Currently, generation facilities are simply idled during
times of insufficient demand. Competition will induce firms to keep
generators running during this time and to sell the power at whatever price
it will fetch. Our estimate of that price is 5.12 cents/kwh on average across
customer classes and regions of the country.
Data from DOE-EIA Forms 860 and 759 give a picture of capacity
utilization. Table 4 shows the capacity utilization rates and electricity
production levels across the utilities for 1994. The mean capacity utilization
rate is 53.9 percent, the median is 55.7, with a standard deviation of 17.5.
Capacity utilization ranges from 96.3 to 5.8 percent. The data on production
show that there are utilities that currently exceed the average full-capacity
utilization mark of 71.6 percent.
Under our short-run competitive production scenario, electricity
production will expand to the point of full capacity utilization. We estimate
this output expansion by assuming that each utility will run its conventional
steam generating facilities full time and that this means these facilities will
operate 71.6 percent of the time, on average. Based on the current capacity
utilization at each utility, increasing production to 71.6 percent capacity
utilization implies an increase in production from these investor-owned
utilities of 26.1 percent. For those utilities that are currently operating in
excess of 71.6 percent, we assume no additional output. The fact that some
utilities are able to achieve capacity utilization rates in excess of 71.6 percent
means that there is some possibility that the entire system can be operated
at efficiency levels in excess of our forecast of full capacity utilization.
Increased capacity utilization should lower average operating and
maintenance costs. Part of this increased efficiency comes from the fact that
increased capacity utilization lowers average fuel costs. Running a plant full
time increases the effective heat rates that can be achieved. Also,
maintenance per unit of output is cheaper.' Fixed cost components of
maintenance get spread over more units.

22. Id.Vol. I at 25.
23. Recall that we have already factored into our computations of output expansion the
additional maintenance time required when plants run longer.
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We estimate the expected cash flow for each utility based on its
production capacity and costs based on the forecasted price in the
competitive regime. We use a modified version of the Law of One Price. We
assume that the market price of electricity will be no higher than 5.12
cents/kwh. However, for those utilities that are currently charging less than
this, price will not increase. We assume that utilities that have excess
capacity that must be put onto the wholesale grid will receive 3 cents/kwh
for this generation. The details of our cost estimation is shown in an
appendix to this paper.
Based on our cash flow analysis, the estimated total value of true
stranded costs is $42 billion. This is shown in Table 5. Thirty eight firms
have stranded costs. The range runs from $12 billion for Pacific Gas and
Electric to $2 million for Northwestern Public Service Co.
There are three notable anomalies in Table 5. First, based on our net
cash flow analysis, Niagara Mohawk has no stranded costs. In part, this is
probably due to the fact that we have not perfectly accounted for the
PURPA contracts this firm holds. However, this does not explain
everything. As we reexamine the financial profile of Niagara Mohawk we
find that it is relatively high cost in general and has high overhead costs.
One is left with the suspicion that the current financial plight of this firm is
due largely to its inability to control expenses. As a stranded cost question
in a freely competitive market for electric generation services, one envisions
the generation facilities of Niagara Mohawk being spun off for whatever
they will fetch. The proceeds of these sales would be deducted from the
book value of remaining assets. By our calculation, the asset sales would
cancel out the book value leaving no stranded costs. Our estimates suggest
that Niagara Mohawk's generation facilities can yield more cash flow to
new investors than they are currently producing in the existing enterprise.
The second anomaly on the list is Entergy. By our calculations,
Entergy should be a big money-maker in the competitive picture. However,
the stock market does not currently see the firm in this light. More detailed
analysis is required.
The last anomaly in the stranded cost list is Idaho Power. Our
estimates indicate that Idaho Power has stranded costs of $300 million. The
reason that this is an anomaly is because Idaho Power is the second lowest
priced utility in the country and has no excess capacity in conventional
steamgeneration facilities. In other words, Idaho Power is predicted to be
almost completely unaffected by deregulation and yet it is predicted to have
stranded costs. As a cross check on our methodology, we found that our
estimate of net cash flows only differed from the actual 1994 cash flows for
Idaho Power by a small amount. This difference was the result of a slight
difference in the tax rate it paid and because of some special income items.
These did not amount to much. In fact, based explicitly on 1994 net cash
flow, the discounted presented value of those cash flows is less than the
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book value of the company. The implication is that regulators in Idaho are
tough or that some other non-regulatory extraordinary event is currently
affecting investor expectations about Idaho.
For the rest of the firms in the sample, the direct estimate of fair
market value of utility assets yields a forecast value of true stranded costs
that is very similar to the numbers that we get from other measures at least
on a utility by utility comparison. Over the sample of investor-owned
utilities, we find that firms currently charging relatively high prices will be
left with some stranded costs in a fully competitive environment. On the
other hand, firms with excess base-load capacity will potentially profit from
competition. The current stock market valuation of all the investor-owned
utilities gives a muted picture of this, reflecting the fact that the financial
community expects that deregulation will be delayed or altered by the
political process. Indeed when we compare the stock market analysis to the
cash flow measurement of stranded costs, we reach the conclusion, as noted
above, that financial investors are forecasting that there will be substantial
excess stranded cost recovery.
3. A Brief History of Electricity Producers in Financial Difficulty
Some utilities that have disproportionately large stranded costs
may be forced into bankruptcy if prices in their markets were to fall to
competitive levels. Will the financial difficulties of these utilities preclude
the delivery of reliable electricity? Our review of the past experiences of
financial distress in this industry lead us to answer this question in the
negative. The fact that insolvent utilities remained viable producers of
electricity both during and after financial restructuring suggests that
electricity customers will not be harmed by any wealth losses visited upon
utility investors.
Some perspective on this question can be gained by examining the
history of reliability and financial distress. NERC has reported no problems
in reliability in the past two decades. Yet over the same time, a handful of
utilities have undergone extended periods of financial distress. Most of
these difficulties are related to investments in nuclear power."
UTILITIES IN DISTRESS
The most notable recent example of financial distress is Public
Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH). PSNH was the lead partner

24. An enlightening introduction is found in Ron Winslow, Utility Chapter 11 FilingMay
Mean Problemsfor Consumers, Investors, WALL STJ., Apr. 17, 1984, at 37. The story starts, "No
electric utility has declared bankruptcy in years-not since the Depression in fact."
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in the construction of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Generator. 2s Seabrook
was a troubled project from the beginning, which can be marked as the
application for a construction permit in early 1972. Permits and plans were
repeatedly delayed, approved, suspended, and reinstated during the mid1970s; ground was finally broken in August, 1976. Nevertheless, groups
opposed to the plant or various aspects of it continued to win court
injunctions and stays that had negative implications for the financial
viability of the project. Financing difficulties halted construction of the first
reactor in 1984 and caused a second to be canceled. The initial expected cost
of Seabrook was $1.0 billion; by the time it was completed in 1989, the total
was $6.3 billion. Forbes magazine referred
to Seabrook as "the largest
26
managerial disaster in business history."
The expense, coupled with the protracted delay in revenue from
power generation produced a river of red ink for PSNH and its partners.
Numerous maneuverings in 1979, including an emergency rate increase,
sales of stock, and rearranging of credit lines signaled trouble. That PSNH
might be forced into bankruptcy was openly discussed at least as early as
1982. In 1984, additional moves including the omission of dividends and
conversion of missed payments to loans forestalled formal bankruptcy
proceedings temporarily. PSNH filed for bankruptcy in January of 1988, the
first investor-owned utility to do so since the 1930s.7 It did not emerge from
bankruptcy until May of 1991, under a plan which involved a subsequent
merger with Northeast Utilities.' The merger was finally completed in June,
1992. The period of financial distress for PSNH lasted over a decade. In
spite of this, there was no idling of any productive facilities of PSNH.
A second utility, El Paso Electric (EPE), fied for bankruptcy in
January, 1992.29 EPE's troubles stemmed from its 15.8 percent share of the
Palo Verde Nuclear project. Signs of financial trouble began in 1986 when
Standard & Poor's lowered its debt rating. In 1987, EPE requested a 33
percent rate increase, and Standard and Poor's lowered the rating again.
EPE sold its stake in Palo Verde for $250 million in 1988 in a lease-back
arrangement, suspended the common stock dividend in 1989, reported its
first loss of $105.8 million and sold additional assets in 1990. By January of
1992, EPE was not expected to avoid bankruptcy. It had survived because

25. This account of the Seabrook story is taken from HENRY F. BEDFORD, SEAMROOK
STATION: CmzEN PoLmcs AND NUcLEAR POwER

(1990).

26. Id. at 30.
27. Lawrence Ingrassia &Christopher J.Chipeilo, PS New HampshireFiles Bankruptcy Plea,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 29,1988, at A2.
28. Public Service ofNew Hampshire,WALL ST. J., May 17,1991, at C8.
29. Ann de Rouffignac, El Paso Feels Pressure to Reorganize Amid Prospects of Bankruptcy
Filing,WALL ST. J., Jan. 6,1992, at B4; Ann de Rouffignac, El PasoElectric, Reeling with Debt, Files
Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9,1992, at AS.
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its creditors granted "extension and waivers." Two serious merger
proposals ultimately failed, and the reorganized company emerged from
bankruptcy protection in February 1996. Again, from the production side,
bankruptcy
did not cause any power plant to be idled.
A third
case is Long Island Lighting Co. (LICLO). LILCO's financial
troubles stemmed from its investment in Shoreham, a nuclear plant that
was built and decommissioned without producing a flicker of power. In
1983, Standard and Poor's downgraded all of LILCO's debt, much of it to
speculative rank." Layoffs, salary cuts, and dividend cuts were
implemented, in its battle to survive the costs from Shoreham. The utility
appeared to be on the verge of bankruptcy several times in 1983 and was
rescued by extension of default deadlines by major lenders and an annual
rate increase of $245 million that the Public Service Commission explicitly
stated would enable the utility to obtain bank financing it needed to stay
solvent.
Dividends on common stock were not restored until September
1989.31 In 1989 LILCO was poised to obtain a license to begin production at
Shoreham when it agreed to decommission the plant in exchange for
billions of dollars in rate increases.' The rate hikes granted in the interest
of keeping LILCO solvent forced its customers to pay the highest electricity
rates in the country. Residential customers paid 16.8 cents per kwh in 1994,
roughly twice the national average and 50 percent above those in the New
Jersey and Connecticut suburbs of New York.' LILCO survives in its
current form only because its customers who are searching for ways to
purchase from alternative sources have been saddled with billions of dollars
in Shoreham expenses.
The infamous 1979 Three Mile Island accident created substantial
financial distress for its owner General Public Utilities. GPU faced massive
losses as a result of the disaster. Clean up costs alone were projected to be
enormous. Yet the most immediate problem stemmed from the loss of two
revenue producing assets-the damaged reactor and an undamaged reactor
(unit #1 which did not return to production until management issues were
resolved in October 1985). Immediately following the accident, the firm
sought $450 million in bank credit to avoid bankruptcy.' Shortly thereafter
a cooling system problem at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Station shut this
plant down for the month of May. Yet the lights stayed on. The firm drew

30. S.&P. Lowers Lilco's RatingAgain, N. Y.TIMIS, May 24,1983, at D6.
31. Lilco Declares25 Cent Dividendon Common Stock, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1989, at C18.
32. New York Regulators ClearAccord on Shoreham, Rates, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6,1989, at A9.
33. Charles M. Studness, ULCO: The Politics of High Electric Rates, Pumic UTILrrE
FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 1,1995, at 42.
34. John R. Emshwiller, GPU Seeks $450 Million in Bank Credit to Payfor Accident, Avoid
Bankruptcy,WALL Sr. J., May 3,1979, at 2.
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additional power from its other generating facilities and negotiated
contracts to purchase electricity with Philadelphia Electric, Pennsylvania
Power and Light, and Ontario Hydro. To solve its financial hemorrhage,
GPU turned repeatedly in the following years to the utility commissions of
New Jersey and Pennsylvania for rate increases, approval to pledge
accounts receivable as collateral for bank loans, and other emergency
measures.s Stock dividends were eliminated and did not resume until April
1987.36
Tucson Electric Power Co's (TEP) troubles stemmed from a "stream
of misdirected investments" in ventures unrelated to electricity. 3 A new
CEO in 1985 began an acquisition binge in auto financing, venture capital,
real estate, and investments in thrift institutions that by the end of 1988 had
swollen to nearly 40 percent of the company's assets. The possibility that
bankruptcy protection would be sought was raised in May of 1990.'
Auditors claimed the company could not stay afloat in April of the
following year, and creditors attempted to force Chapter 11 proceedings in
July. Financial restructuring was ultimately completed in December of 1992,
although losses continued to plague the company in 1993 and 1994. 39
Finally we have the default of a publicly-owned utility. The
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) was organized in 1957
for the purpose of developing electric power generating facilities.' WPPSS
originally consisted of 17 municipal electric utilities. WPPSS and the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) made ambitious plans to develop
as many as twenty nuclear power plants to serve the Pacific Northwest
region. The first project, begun in 1971, was to build three plants at an
expected cost of $1.6 billion; these costs were to be shared by 105 municipal

35. Pennsylvania P&L, GPU Set PriceAccord On ElectricitySupply, WALL ST. J., June 6,1979
at 12; GPU Agrees to Buy Some Electric Powerfrom CanadaFirm, WALL ST. J., July 10,1979 at 4;
GPU Unit Seeks Annual Rate Rise of $113 Million, WALL ST. J., May 7,1979, at 2; Jersey Central P&L
Is Granted $70 Million Annual Rate Bost, WALST. J., Sept. 7,1979 at 2; GPU Unit is Told to show
Why Its License In PennsylvaniaShouldn't Be Rescinded, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1979 at 12; GPU
Utility Granted Interim Rate Increaseby PennsylvaniaPUG, WAa ST. J., Feb. 11, 1980 at 38; General
Public Utilities Says Two Units Plan To Filefor Rate Boosts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,1980 at 14; GPU
Unit Granted $34.2 Million Boost in New Jersey Rates, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2,1980 at 5.
36. GeneralPublic UtilitiesSets Its FirstPayouton Common Since 79, WAaST. J., Apr. 3,1987
at 39
37. Frederick Rose, Troubles Beset Utility After Its ChiefMakes An Abrupt Departure,WALL
ST. J., Aug. 22,1989 at Al.
38. Tucson ElectricCo. Might Have to Seek Bankruptcy-Law Aid, WALL ST. J., May 17,1990 at
B9.
39. Restructuring Plan Gets Approval of Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1992 at A4;
Rhonda L Rundle, Tucson Electric Completes Revamp, Averting Bankruptcy-Liw Protection,WALL
ST. J.,. Dec. 16,1992 at A4.
40. See JAMES LiGLAND & ROBERT LAMB, WPP$$: WHO IS TO BLwE FOR THE WPPSS

DISASM (1986).
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utilities and five private utilities involved as partners. In 1976 most of these
same utilities combined to build two additional plants. This was somewhat
out of step with national trends. By 1974, dozens of nuclear projects outside
of the Pacific Northwest had been canceled, and a greater number were
being delayed.
In 1981, a review by the budget director projected the total cost of
the project to be $23.8 billion. Work on the second batch of plants was
terminated. Eventually, two of the three original plants were mothballed;
only one plant was ultimately completed. Court rulings invalidated the
contracts signed by some of the municipal utilities to finance the second
batch of plants. As a result, WPPSS defaulted on $2.25 billion of debt in July
of 1983, the largest municipal default in the nation's history. Litigation over
this default continued into the 1990s. Even so, it does not seem to have had
led to a significant decline in the flow of capital to public enterprises.
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEREGULATION AND STRANDED COST
RECOVERY
The cases discussed above are noteworthy but not unique. Financial
conditions deteriorated across the board for utilities during this period. In
1970, S&P's bond ratings were AA or AAA for 80 percent of the electric
utilities. By 1981, there were none with AAA ratings and just 25 percent had
a rating of AA. The idea that utilities represent the safest return is no longer
credible.
Typically, these troubles trace to investment in nuclear power
plants. Investors lost big sums; electricity consumers lost even more. When
in financial difficulty, utilities with nuclear investments repeatedly
requested and received rate increases from the state public utility
commissions. It is important to recognize that the rate increases preserved
the principal of bond holders and not the existing physical assets of
producers. To the extent that these increases protected future investment in
generating capacity, the consumers may have been particularly ill-served."
The result of these decisions is a checkerboard pattern of electricity rates
(New York, its neighbors, and the state of New Mexico are prime examples)
whose only rationale is that one utility district made a nuclear investment
and its neighbor did not.
Our review of the evidence finds not a single mention of reliability
problems related to these firms. This should be no surprise. Theory suggests

41. Even before the massive cost overruns had taken place, the finance director of the
Public Utility Commission in New Hampshire found that the generating capacity (PSNH)
proposed for Seabrook was not needed and would unnecessarily raise the electricity bills of
New Hampshire consumers.
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that they would continue to produce electricity because the net revenues
from continued operation are enormous. The ability to generate electricity
is a producer's greatest asset and its most direct remedy for a shortfall in
cash flow.
The stranded cost question may be in large part an issue of a series
of imprudent nuclear power plant investments. The few, high-rate utilities
that will be hurt by competition typically have big nuclear investments,
some of which are not producing electricity. In general, nuclear power
plants are efficient producers of electricity. However, in several isolated but
notorious cases, where the timing of investment was bad and where
construction delays added to capital costs, nuclear plants will never recover
their original costs except by regulatory fiat or some other transfer of money
from consumers or taxpayers. Denial of stranded costs would do much of
what bankruptcy did in these cases (or in the case of LILCO, could have
done), but history suggests that it would not shut off the power or reduce
the willingness or capacity of the industry to invest prudently in the future.
The preceding cases suggest that bankruptcy, while a nightmare for
equity investors and bond holders, seems to have had virtually no impact
on the production and delivery of electricity. The lesson we draw from this
is that any financial difficulties created by deregulation are likely to be
absorbed by the industry in the same manner. The chief difference is that
rate increases paid by consumers to high cost firms will be replaced by
capital losses incurred by those firms' investors.
4. Efficiency Rationales Advanced By Proponents of Stranded Cost
Recovery
Our analysis to this point indicates that, while stranded costs may have
important financial consequences for a select group of utilities, both theory and
history suggests that the impact on the production of electricity will be
negligible. We are left with the question, Why is so much made of stranded
costs in the case of electric utilities? Proponents of recovery base their case on
two issues: the existence of a regulatory compact and the cost of capital.
THE REGULATORY COMPACT THEORY
Baumol and Sidak, among others, have recently proposed the
regulatory compact theory, which argues that a compact or implicit contract
was created by the public regulation of utilities.42 The compact is one in
which electric utilities agreed to sell their output at prices determined by
government regulators. They also agreed to sell the desired demand for

42. BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 2.
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power at the regulated prices, and they agreed to supply power in their
designated service area to all buyers in that market regardless of the cost of
connection and service. In exchange, the utilities were granted freedom
from competition, the right to recover their variable costs, and the right to
make a "fair-rate-of-return" on their prudent investments. Proponents of
the compact theory of regulation assert that electric utilities should be
allowed to recover their stranded costs; otherwise the state has reneged on
its part of the bargain.
The state should live up to its obligations. But the regulatory
compact theory has blinders on: the fundamental problem is that there also
exists a compact between citizens and their government. All citizens, not
just the owners of electric utility stocks and bonds have a compact with
their government. This latter view suggests that a compact between electric
utilities and government is not special or deserving. Furthermore, any such
compact is a two-way deal. Producers and consumers were supposed to get
competitive prices as part of the bargain.
Whether a one-way compact with electric utility investors ever
existed is a matter of individual opinion. We simply note that if the compact
theory applies, then the debt of public utilities should have the same risk
level as government bonds. If, as asserted, the one-way compact theory
implies producers have a right to stranded cost recovery, then government
cannot take action that decreases the net revenue stream required to
maintain the approved rate of return. Even a superficial analysis of bond
prices and yields reveals that electric utility debt has a higher return,
implying higher risk, than comparable, risk-free government securities. This
implies that the holders of this debt believe that there is at least some chance
that any one-way compact between government and regulated firms is not
inviolate.
Table 6 shows the yields to electric utility and government bonds
for the period 1985-1990. Note that the electric utility yield is always higher,
implying greater risk. The difference should average zero under the
compact theory of regulation, but it does not. Further, the risk premium
varies in standard ways. Two groups of researchers analyzed the response
of the financial markets to the Three Mile Island accident. Barrett, et al., find
that the risk premium in utility bonds increased 20 to 30 basis points
following the accident.43 Bowen, et al., conclude from stock market
movements that "Investors appear to believe that losses to utilities
committed to nuclear energy will not be fully compensated for [.]" as a

43. W. Brian Barrett, et aL, The Effect of Three Mile Island on Utility Bond Risk Premia:A Note,
J.Op FIN., at 255 (1986).
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result of the Three Mile Island accident."
The existence of this risk premium for electric utility bonds shrouds
the compact theory in darkness. While there may have been a conceptual
understanding between regulators and utilities, financial investors did not
view the deal as risk free. And well they shouldn't, as the evidence of
suspended dividends and default in the previous section attests. If there is
a one-way regulatory compact, why have bond-holders of the Washington
Public Power Supply System failed to recover the full value of their
financial investment stranded by the default of these securities? History
provides little evidence to support the claim that the compact theory implies
recovery of stranded costs.
THE COST OF CAPITAL JUSTIFICATION FOR STRANDED COST
RECOVERY
As we have pointed out in a number of contexts, stranded costs
cannot, by themselves, idle or render unusable any facility. However, some
analysts have advanced the proposition that stranded cost recovery wil
have implications for the allocation of capital to the electric utility industry.
In particular, they argue that the denial of stranded cost recovery will lead
to a downgrading in bond ratings. According to this argument, the lower
quality bonds raise the cost of capital to the industry, and this is bad. This
line of argument is misleading.
First, the costs involved are sunk; their recovery is primarily an
issue of wealth distribution, not resource allocation. Deregulation itself,
regardless of the issue of stranded cost recovery, may well increase the cost
of capital. But there is every presumption that this is efficient and will
improve the allocation of capital to the economy as a whole. To the extent
that capital investment decisions in this industry have been based solely on
the portion of risk borne by investors, capital costs have been artificially
low. The end result has been excessive investment in capital in this
industry. Shifting the risk of capital onto the shoulders of producers
addresses this problem.'
With regulation and revenue recovery, the risk of changes in capital
values is borne by electric utility consumers. With competition, this risk
shifts to capital owners. The simple shifting of risk does not increase its
magnitude or jeopardize the production and consumption in the industry.
It simply redistributes the risk to different parties. Moreover, firms with the

44. Robert M. Bowen, et al., Intra-IndustryEffects of the Accident at Three Mile Island,J. oF
FIN. & QUANTrrATIV. ANALYSIS, at 106 (1986).
45. As discussed below, producers can voluntarily contract with buyers to share this risk
by a long-term contracting relation in an unregulated environment.
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ability to manage and diversify risk via the share holding of their owners
are far and away more efficient risk bearers than consumers of the product.
On both counts, the economy is better off because efficiency is enhanced.
Consider also that deregulation is likely to substantially alter the
means of marginal capital expansion. If additional capital in the industry is
provided by relatively small, relatively efficient gas turbine generators and
if much of this generating capacity is owned by industrial users that
provide power to the electricity transmission grid in conjunction with
meeting their own thermal and electricity energy needs, the riskiness of
marginal capital investment in the electric power production is not identical
to the riskiness of the currently invested capital.
EFFICIENT BEARING OF RISK
At any moment in time there is uncertainty about the future value
of electricity to consumers. The consumption value of electricity can rise or
fall as progress unfolds and invention changes the structure of relative
prices. That risk can be distributed across a wide variety and classes of
individuals. In the simplest case, the seller of the product bears all the risk
of price and cost changes. Customers come and go as the price varies. In
more complicated scenarios, sellers can arrange long-term contracts with
buyers that shift some of the uncertainty to the purchasers. In the case of
electricity, since sellers are allowed to recover all of their prudent costs, a
significant portion of price and cost variability has historically been placed
on the shoulders of consumers. Shifting this risk back to producers does not,
by itself, change the underlying structure of uncertainty.
There is, however, a positive benefit of shifting the risk to
producers, since the production side of the market is better equipped to
manage risk. Clearly, electric utility investors can diversify their financial
holdings across a broad spectrum of assets and thereby eliminate any
systematic risk unique to electricity production. " In addition, producers are
in better position to anticipate and manage inherent risk than consumers.
In order to deal efficiently with fluctuating electricity prices, consumers
would have to individually arrange for alternative fuels for heating,
lighting, and the like, or purchase the proper financial portfolio. By virtue
of their relatively small purchase volumes, the diversification options for
consumers are relatively costly. The shifting of risk from producers to

46. It bears noting that institutional investors are substantial owners of most public utility
stock. For instance, 38.2% of all Duke Power common shares are held by institutions. On
average, across the entire portfolio of publicly traded utilities, 31.3% of all common shares
outstanding are held by institutions.
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consumers inherent in the current regulatory regime is one of its
pathological features, not something to be preserved.
5.

On the Efficient Recovery of Stranded Costs

In the previous four sections we have argued that the recovery of
stranded costs will have no impact on the deployment and allocation of
capital. Whether a firm recovers its stranded costs or not has no impact on
its decisions as to what types of fuel to use, how much output to produce,
what price to charge, what types of new investments to make, the
appropriate level of maintenance, or any other operating characteristic.
Recovery of stranded costs will enrich stock and bond holders at the
expense of consumers and taxpayers. As long as stranded costs are
recovered efficiently, the question is purely one of wealth redistribution.
UNIT CHARGES ARE INEFFICIENT
The essential requirement for efficient recovery is that charges be
designed so that they avoid any impact on marginal decisions. In short, the
efficient method of transferring funds from electric utility consumers to
producers is with a fixed charge or access fee. Consider the graph
represented in Figure 1. The demand for electricity and the marginal cost
of producing power are shown.' Under competition, the price of power will
be P. At that price, consumers will buy q, units of power per period.
Now suppose that regulations are put in place so that under
competition producers are allowed to recover some or all of their stranded
costs via a unit increment of tax on power. Let this unit recovery charge be
r. The price of electricity will rise to P, and the consumption will decline to
q,. Note that the price of electricity will rise by the amount of the recovery
charge if the marginal cost of supplying electricity is constant over the
relevant range of output. In the diagram, the new, net-of-recovery charge
payment to utilities for power falls from Pc to C, (because marginal cost is
rising and less total output is being produced). Those utilities that do not
recover any of their stranded costs will see a lower market price for
electricity. This will idle the facilities with the highest marginal costs of
production, and as the graph confirms, total output will decline.
The utilities will receive an extra r*q, of revenue which will be
called the stranded cost recovery. Some of this is just a transfer of consumer
surplus to utilities that will have no ill economic effects. However, as the
graph reveals, there is a dead-weight loss to the economy engendered by

47. We have obviously abstracted from the various classes of users for the sake of
simplicity here.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

the unit price recovery method. ' This dead-weight loss is the shaded area,
abc, in the figure. A portion of this triangle is lost consumer surplus and a
portion is lost producer profit. The lost triangle is the inefficiency created
by recovery of stranded costs based on a unit charge. The inefficiency does
not arise from the fact that consumer surplus is transferred to producers.
The inefficiency is created because the marginal value of power exceeds its
marginal cost of production. Imposing regulation that stipulates that
stranded costs are to be recovered by a per-unit fee, r, drives a wedge
between the value of power to consumers and its cost of production at the
margin. A potential gain from trade is denied.
The worst example of the per unit fee would be for regulators to
tack the recovery fee onto transmission rates. High (stranded) cost utilities
would like nothing better than for transmission rates to soak up the
difference between low cost producers and the current regulated prices in
their market. But there are no stranded costs in transmission, and bundling
these two activities creates an inefficient cross subsidy. 9
AVOIDING THE DEAD-WEIGHT LOSS
There is a simple way to avoid the dead-weight loss of stranded
costs recovery which still allows for recovery. The efficient system uses
access or lump-sum fees to transfer funds between consumers and
producers. In effect, the price of electricity has two components. One
component, the access charge, is for the use of the system. This charge does
not depend on the amount of electricity purchased by any consumer. The
other component is the unit charge. It bears noting that the move to
competition in long distance telephony has created this two-part scheme.
Each telephone user pays a network access fee and then pays per minute
charge for the long-distance calls. The access fee bears no relation to number
or duration of long-distance calls.
Figure 2 demonstrates the relative efficiency of two-part prices over
unit-cost recovery. Again under competition and no recovery of stranded
costs, the price of electricity will be Pc and consumption will be q, Suppose
there are n homogeneous consumers who create the demand for power.
Then suppose that R is the amount of stranded costs that regulators have
mandated that utilities be allowed to recover. The efficiency access fee is
R/n per period per customer. Note that this has no impact on the unit price
48. Rent seeking costs are also relevant here, but it appears that these will be incurred
regardless of whether recovery is imposed or not. If there were no question that recovery
would be denied then these costs would be minimized.
49. The court said in Cajun Electric Co-op Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994), that
imposing generation cost on transmission fees is an illegal tying arrangement under antitrust
law.
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of electricity. Assuming that there are no income effects in demand
generated by this access fee, then demand is unaltered. Some analysts have
suggested that this two-part access fee will reduce the number of customers.
This need not be the case. Each consumer who was previously purchasing
power continues to purchase the same amount prior to the access charge.
This two-part price allows for the transfer of funds from consumers to
producers without affecting the market equilibrium. No doubt, the wealth
of consumers is lower, but the wealth of producers is higher by an exact
offset. This is just a transfer with no impact on operational efficiency,
economic welfare, or gross national product. It simply is a transfer of wealth
with no other consequencesw
Exit Fees
It has been proposed that utilities be allowed to charge "exit" fees
when they lose their customers to rivals. Exit fees are an inefficient means
of transferring income to utilities. If Firm A has a customer who wishes to
do business with Firm B, but the exit fee prevents the change, then the
customer and the economy is stuck with the higher cost producer, A, in lieu
of the lower cost seller, B.
Some analysts have incorrectly argued that exit fees are efficient on
the grounds that Firm A has lower operating costs than B but higher fixed
costs of operation due to some circumstance. Suppose costs are as just
described. The error in this argument is the assumption that fixed costs will
cause firm A to lose customers to Firm B. It is the marginal costs of
operating that determine price, at least in the short run. The higher nonmarginal operating costs will not raise the price offered by Firm A when
bidding for business. Even if the lower marginal cost firm, A, was forced to
bankruptcy by its fixed obligations, its operating capital would reemerge,
reorganized under new ownership. The financial reorganization would not
alter Firm A's inherent operating cost advantage.

50. An alternative to two-part tariffs is to use the general taxing authority of the state to
provide the lost wealth. In other words, states could levy an income tax and pay these proceeds
to the electric utilities to cover their lost income from lower electric prices. Of course, most any
observer would say that this is politically unlikely. Therein lies the point. A two-part tariff is
nothing more than a consumption tax on electricity consumers. Neither a tax on electric
consumers or a general tax has any operational implications for the electric power industry.
Why one might be considered unlikely and the other a real prospect is an intriguing question.
Given that almost all income-tax payers are also electricity consumers, the distinction is
economically vacuous. The fact that a tax and subsidy scheme smacks of corporate welfare does
not change the color of the horse.
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Partial Recovery of Stranded Costs
There are proposals to allow some, but not all of stranded costs to
be transferred to producers. As long as this recovery is not based on unit
price increases or transmission cost increases, there is no reduction in the
net welfare gains from competition. Any stranded cost recovery based on
access fees reduces consumer welfare by the amount of the stranded cost
recovery but has no effect on net welfare.
6.

CONCLUSION

This paper uses standard economic methods to assess the
implications of stranded cost recovery in the process of deregulating electric
utilities. Economic theory implies that stranded cost recovery is primarily
an issue of wealth redistribution, with little or no impact on the utilization
or allocation of capital. The history of utilities in financial difficulty
buttresses this conclusion-production and distribution of electricity
continues unabated in the midst of financial reorganization.
The financial markets provide evidence on the potential magnitude
of stranded costs in this industry. This source of information suggests that
the size of these costs is much smaller than proponents of recovery have
argued. Further, the distribution of stranded costs varies significantly from
one utility to the next; among utilities there will be both winners and losers
from deregulation, which is no surprise.
The efficiency rationales advanced by proponents of recovery do
not bear close scrutiny. The compact theory has been used to imply that
government has guaranteed utilities a revenue stream sufficient to cover all
costs. The corollary to this proposition, that the yields on utility and
government debt are identical is clearly inconsistent with the facts. Denial
of stranded cost recovery thus does not violate a compact, and does not
threaten capital investment with the prospect of future "takings." To the
extent that the cost of capital is altered by deregulation, there is every
presumption that this will improve the economy-wide allocation of capital
in the future.
Historically, electric utilities have petitioned the government for
revenues which cover their costs and provide a return to their investors.
The petition to recover stranded costs continues an age-old tradition
between the utilities and regulatory agencies. There is little in this tradition
to give confidence that stranded cost recovery will proceed in an efficient
manner, and every reason to believe that it will prolong the realization of
the gains from deregulation of the markets for electricity.
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APPENDIX
Using data that we have from the various DOE databases we
estimate average cost as a function of capacity utilization and then derive
the value of marginal cost. From these estimates of average and marginal
cost, we estimate the potential cash flows that firms will enjoy in a
competitive electricity market. Based on the cash flows, we derive the fair
market value of their utility assets and then calculate the value of true
stranded costs.
We estimate an overall operation and maintenance average cost
AC=o+PF,+

-

function using an iterative maximum likelihood technique based on the
following cost function specification:
where AC is total operation and maintenance cost for conventional steam
generating facilities divided by output from these facilities, U is capacity
utilization at these facilities, and F is the average cost of fuel. Including fuel
cost in the regression is a way of accounting for the fact that some
generating facilities are located in areas where transportation cost of fuel
significantly increases its cost. Holding the one component of cost constant,
we estimate the effect on cost of changes in capacity utilization.
We estimate this equation using 92 observations available for
investor-owned utilities with conventional steam generating facilities. We
exclude observations for those utilities that have capacity utilization rates
below 20 percent. The estimation results in a good fit. R2 is .86, which says
that the model explains over four-fifths of the variation in average cost. The
standard error of the residual is .25 cents/kwh. The following parameter
values are obtained: PO = 1; 32 = 1; P2= 1. The model specification we employ
assumes that average cost falls continuously, but this assumption is
consistent with the observed value of average cost across the range of the
data. Of course, there is variation across utilities that we are not capturing
in this model. We include the age of the generating facilities in the
estimated function, but it is not related to cost. This is consistent with the
information we have received from plant engineers and electric power
consultants concerning the operation and maintenance of conventional
steam generating facilities.
Using our cost function estimate, we forecast average cost at the
point of full capacity utilization, which we conservatively assume to be 71.6
percent. We also derive the value of marginal cost at this point. Over the 98
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firms in the table, the mean current average cost is 2.49 cents/kwh. Average
cost is forecast to fall to 2.26 cents/kwh for these firms when the industry
moves to full capacity utilization.5' Finally, marginal cost at the point of full
capacity utilization will be around 2.16 cents/kwh. There is only one value
above 4 cents/kwh. This is for Central Vermont Public Service Corp., which
has very limited, non-base load steam facilities. Based on these cost
estimates, we predict that virtually all the conventional steam generating
facilities in the country will be called into full-time service when generation
is competitively marketed.
The competitive equilibrium that we forecast earlier involves
competitive price being driven to 5.12 cents/kwh as idled capacity is fully
employed. We assumed that all prices would fall by the relative proportion
that 5.12 cents/kwh is to the overall current average price of 6.9 cents/kwh.
An alternative assumption is that the Law of One Price will operate and that
all consumers, everywhere will pay 5.12 cents/kwh. Between these
extremes we have a spectrum of other possible scenarios. We develop the
most likely of these now.
The effect of competition on investor-owned utilities is analyzed in
the following fashion. For each utility, we forecast revenue based on a
maximum price of 5.12 cents/kwh times the current level of electricity sales
plus any additional generation output that the utility undertakes. On the
basis of the price declines alone, several of the highest pricing utilities will
suffer substantial revenue declines. While these will be partially offset by
extra generation, the difference is still substantial. Even though competition
will bring revenue shortfalls to many utilities, this does not mean that these
utilities will all necessarily suffer financial crisis. To assess the impact of
competition on the financial viability of the investor-owned electric utility
industry, we construct a forecast of cash flows that will result from a move
to competition.
Our outline of financial flows is as follows:
REVENUE

X

Current Sales Of Electricity
the smaller of current price or 5.12
cents/kwh

Revenue
= from Current
Production

Additional Generation (from operating
conventional steam facilities at full
capacity)

51. This forecast assumes that input prices remain constant. In MALONEY, et a., supranote
1, we explore alternative scenarios where input prices are influenced by output expansion.
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X

Revenue
from
Expanded
Production

5.12 cents/kwh if sold in home market
or 3 cents/kwh if sold in wholesale
market

Total
Production

SUM

COSTS
+

Current Power Production Expenses (not
including purchased power expenses)

+

Additional Generation Cost (Cost / kwh
estimated as function of capacity utilization)

+

"

"

Forecast Purchase Power Expenses
(minimum of current purchases power rate
or 3 cents/kwh, except in NY and CA)
Forecast transmission and Distribution costs
(estimated as function of price)
Forecast Customer Accounts, Sales,
Administration and General Expenses
(estimated as function of price)

Operating
SUM

+

Taxes (current tax rate H [total revenueoperating expenses-current depreciation])

+

Forecast Capital Expenditures (estimated as
function of type of capacity and price)

=

Expenses

= Total Costs

CASH
FLOW
Total Revenue
Total Costs

=

Net
Cash Flow
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Our cash flow analysis is built on a modified interpretation of the
Law of One Price. We assume that price will fall to the average fullcapacity-utilization value that we derived in our earlier work, that is, 5.12
cents/kwh. However, for utilities that are currently selling for less than this,
their price will not increase. Competition will cause price to fall on
electricity that is currently being sold. At the same time, competition allows
for additional sales. We treat these additional sales in the following way: If
a utility increases its generation in percentage terms by less than the decline
in its price, then we assume that it sells all of its additional power to its
existing customers at the 5.12 cents/kwh price. If its generation increase is
larger than the decline in its price (for instance, suppose its current price is
below 5.12) then we assume that it sells the additional power on the
wholesale market at 3 cents/kwh.
Costs are broken down into categories and analyzed as such. We
cost current generation at the current level and additional generation at
estimated marginal cost as discussed above. Purchased power expenses are
priced at 3 cents/kwh or the current price the utility is paying if that is
lower, except in New York and California. For utilities in these two states,
because of the existence of high priced PURPA purchased power contracts,
we assume that purchased power costs will not decline to 3 cents. Since we
do not know exactly how much power the various utilities in these two
states purchase under PURPA, we assume that the price of their purchased
power will fall from its current level half way to the current purchase price
of 3 cents.
We find three types of cost to be especially sensitive to the level of
the regulated price. These are capital expenditures, transmission and
distribution costs (T&D), and customer, sales, general, and administrative
costs (CSGA). For each of these, we find that the per kwh cost was
positively and statistically significantly related to the level of the regulated
price the utility is allowed to charge. We interpret this to mean that there is
some regulatory slack in operations and capital costs. For instance, some
employees of regulated electric utilities may make higher wages/salaries
than their market opportunity wage. At all events, we expect that
competition will cause utilities to become more lean, that is, we expect that
costs will fall under the impetus of competitive pressures.
In order to account for this, we estimate the log of per unit cost of
T&D and CSGA as a function of the difference between the current price
and 5.12 where the current price was greater than 5.12 (and zero if smaller).
In both cases, this simple regression explains over half of the variation in
this average cost measure. We use a modified ridge-regression approach to
forecast costs. As our forecast, we use one standard deviation below the cost
value given by the estimated equation where the estimated equation is
evaluated at a price of 5.12 cents. For those utilities that are currently
experiencing cost lower than this we use their actual cost. In the case of
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T&D, we multiply forecast average cost by current generation plus the
forecast increase in generation from full capacity utilization. For CSGA, we
assume that these costs will be relatively unaffected by the expansion of
generation.
Our approach to estimating capital costs is very similar. We
estimate current capital expenditures per unit of capacity as a function of
the type of installed capacity. Specifically, we find that the percentage of
capacity that is conventional steam and nuclear is significantly negatively
related to current capital expenditures, implying that hydro, combinedcycle, and gas turbine facilities require larger more frequent infusions of
capital to maintain their productive capability. Again we find that capital
expenditures are significantly related to the level of regulated price. To
account for this we regress the log of per capacity capital expenditures on
the percent of capacity made up by conventional steam, the percent made
up by nuclear, and the difference between regulated price and 5.12 cents if
positive. The R2 of the estimated equation is .5. We forecast capital
expenditures as one standard deviation below the mean value given by the
estimated equation evaluated at a price of 5.12 cents, or actual capital
expenditures where those are lower.
Finally, we based taxes on an overall rate of 35 percent applied to
taxable income. Taxable income is revenue minus operating expenses minus
depreciation. We used the current level of depreciation. Of course tax rates
vary around this. However, in a competitive environment there will be less
political influence affecting rates. Our prediction is that they will tend
toward this value.
The fair market value of the firm is the capitalized value of the net
cash flows. We discount these cash flows at a real interest rate of eight
percent, which is based on a risk-adjusted rate for equity in competitive
electric power production of 12 percent less an inflation rate of four percent.
Table 5 shows the estimated fair market value of utility assets, forecast
equity value, and estimated true stranded costs for the 98 investor-owned
utilities in the sample.

(Vol. 37

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Table 1
Accounting and Market Valuation Methods
Original
Scenario

After 5 Years,
Before Revenue
Decline

After 5 Years,
After Revenue
Decline

Accounting Method

$1,000,000

$500,000

$500,000

Net Cash Flow
Valuation Method

$1,742,513

$1,123,786

$224,775

.$0

$0

Stranded Costs

$500,000
$224,775
= $275,224
-

Equity Value of
Business if
Continue to
Operate
Equity Value of
Business if Facility
is Abandoned

$1,742,513

$1,123,786

$224,775
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Table 2
Market Value of Equity Divided by Book Value of Equity 1993-1995
& Market Equity 1995 Value Line Utilities
Market
Equity

Market to Book
1993

1994

1995

1995

Allegheny Power System Inc

1.56

1.34

1.68

$3,591

American Electric Power Co

1.61

1.42

1.81

7,808

Atlantic Energy Inc NJ

1.47

121

1.12

920

Baltimore Gas &Electric Co

1.34

1.22

1.43

3,963

Black Hills Corp

2.13

1.67

1.91

344

Boston Edison Co

1.52

1.28

1.26

1,293

Carolina Power &Light Co

1.88

1.59

1.97

5,191

Centerior Energy Corp

1.32

.85

.63

1,221

Central Hudson Gas &Elec Co

1.30

1.05

1.13

592

Central Louisiana Elec Inc

1.72

1.53

1.57

446

Central Maine Power Co

1.14

.85

.91

170

Corp

1.52

1.17

.96

5,347

Central &South West Corp

2.01

1.59

1.68

514

Colcorp Inc

1.51

1.25

1.55

565

Cinergy Corp

1.55

1.56

1.84

4,650

CIPSCO Inc

1.70

1.47

1.99

1,294

CMS Energy Corp

2.01

1.74

1.87

2,685

Commonwealth Energy
System

1.39

1.18

1.25

472

Utility

Central Vermont Public SVC
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Consolidated Edison of New
York

1.57

1.22

1.35

7,435

Delmarva Power & Light Co

1.61

1.36

1.43

1,324

Detroit Edison Co.

1.49

1.19

1.44

4,957

Dominion Resources Inc

1.66

1.51

1.46

6,915

DPL Inc

2.04

1.90

2.05

2,389

DQE

1.47

1.27

1.67

2,211

Duke Power Co

1.90

1.71

2.10

10,053

Eastern Utilities Association

1.53

1.33

1.16

430

Edison International (SCE)

1.72

1.20

1.20

7,674

Empire District Electric Co

1.77

1.42

1.35

247

Enova Corp (San Diego G & E)

1.96

1.68

1.67

2,739

Entergy Corp

1.28

1.05

.97

6,335

Florida Progress Corp

1.66

1.40

1.57

3,278

FPL Group Inc

1.77

1.48

1.85

8,163

General Public Utilities

1.33

1.24

1.26

3,735

Green Mountain Power Corp

1.57

1.26

1.25

132

Hawaiian Electric
Industries

1.50

1.39

1.45

1,046

Houston Industries Inc

1.84

1.42

1.35

5,646

Idaho Power Co

1.69

1.46

1.62

1,066

IES Industries

1.55

1.26

1.36

827

Illinova Corp

1.32

1.06

1.39

2,135

Interstate Power Corp

1.56

1.27

1.48

293

IPALCO

1.92

1.50

1.76

1,452

Winter 1997]

STRANDED COST RECOVERY

Kansas City Power & Light
Co

1.72

1.50

1.75

1,569

KU Energy

1.61

1.65

1.73

1,087

LG & E Energy Corp

1.74

1.61

1.77

1,411

Long Island Lighting Co

1.33

.97

.86

2,111

MDU Resources Inc

1.76

1.67

1.86

627

MidAmerican Energy

1.42

1.23

1.46

1,782

Minnesota Power & Light
Co

1.84

1.61

1.32

788

Montana Power Co

1.52

1.34

1.22

1,187

Nevada Power Co

1.58

1.31

1.32

1,023

New England Electric
System

1.70

1.40

1.49

2,413

New York State Elec & Gas
Corp

1.43

1.04

.94

1,638

Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp

1.29

.96

.39

983

NIPSCO Industries Inc

1.83

1.70

2.05

2,279

Norhteast Utilities

1.43

1.25

1.04

2,504

Northern States Power Co
MN

1.61

1.51

1.65

3,314

Northwestern Public
Service Co

2.09

1.81

1.75

266

Ohio Edison Co

1.60

1.29

1.37

3,273

Oklahoma Gas & Electric
Co

1.59

1.46

1.67

1,600

Orange & Rockland
Utilities Inc

1.55

1.25

1.42

538

Otter Tail Power.Co

2.36

2.063

2.31
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Pacific Gas & Electric Co

1.73

1.41

1.20

10,430

PACIFICORP

1.62

1.45

1.64

5,291

PECO Energy Co

1.53

1.38

1.32

6,000

Pinnacle West Capital Corp

1.19

.95

1.29

2,453

Portland General Corp

1.23

1.09

1.49

1,299

Potomac Electric Power
Corp

1.59

1.36

1.61

3,004

PPL Resources Inc

1.79

1.45

1.48

3,819

Public Service Co of CO

1.55

1.37

1.65

2,215

Public Service Co of NM

.89

.81

1.09

762

Public Service Enterprise
Group

1.57

1.29

1.20

6,475

Puget Sound Power & Light
Co

1.43

1.12

1.37

1,588

Rochester Gas & Electric Co

1.37

1.17

1.11

838

Scana Corp

1.62

1.55

2.12

2,714

Sierra Pacific Resources

1.24

1.09

1.39

735

SIG Corp

1.88

1.54

1.65

523

Southern Co

1.76

1.58

1.81

15,723

Southwestern Public
Service Co

1.88

1.60

1.85

1,334

St Joseph Light &Power Co

1.75

1.39

1.56

126

TECO Energy Inc

2.57

2.20

2.48

2,854

Texas Utilities Co

1.56

1.26

1.59

9,034

TNP Enterprises Inc

.85

.94

1.09

246

Tucson Electric Power Co

8.33

13.46

39.13

503

UNICOM Corp

1.08

.98

1.10

6,404

Winter 1997]

STRANDED COST RECOVERY

Union Electric Corp

1.86

1.58

1.74

4,089

Unites Illuminating Co

1.46

1.13

1.17

518

Utilicorp United Inc

1.51

1.40

1.43

1,083

Washington Water Power
Co

1.60

1.31

1.46

1,049

Western Resources Inc

1.47

1.27

1.22

1,876

Wisconsin Energy Corp

1.73

1.58

1.69

3,109

WPL Holdings Inc

1.78

1.53

1.56

766

WPS Resources Corp

1.84

1.60

1.66

771

Notes: Market equity in millions. Data in table areconstructedfrom Value Line
Ratingsand Reports, Value Line Publishing,Inc., 1996 and Wall Street Journal,
Company Briefing Book, online service, March 1996. Market value of equityfor
1993 and 1994 areaverage of high and low stock pricefor the year. Market value of
equityfor 1995 is based on yearend stock price.
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Table 3
Price and Average Cost-Across Investor-Owned Utilities
Average

Average

Conven-

Fossil

Revenue

Costs
All
Facilities

tional
Steam

Fuel

O&M

O&M

Utility

Nuclear

O&M

Long Island LTG Co

151.4

60.2,

35.6

28.2

19.7

Consolidated Edison
Co NY Inc

133.6

66.8

47.4

28.6

16.9

Citizens Utilities Co

106.7

73.6

24.3

NA

NA

105.9

60.5

25.8

18.3

21.4

Fitchburg Gas & Elec
Lt Co

103.4

71.3

35.3

25.3

14.3

Edison International

99.9

66.0

27.3

22.1

18.3

United mum Co

98.8

55.0

30.2

21.6

25.8

Bangor Hydro Electic
Co

98.0

77.8

45.8

27.5

NA

Boston Edison Co

97.5

62.9

31.8

22.8

31.3

Enova Corp

93.6

52.3

41.5

30.9

22

Public Service
Enterprise Group

93.4

42.5

21.4

8.6

24.1

91.5

53.8

28.7

18.9

28.2

Orange & Rockland
Utils Inc

89.9

57.8

31.8

25.1

NA

Rochester Gas & Elec
Corp

89.2

41.5

28.8

17.4

Pacific Gas & Elec Co

Atlantic Energy Inc NJ

Winter 19971
Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp
Maine Public Service
Co

STRANDED COST RECOVERY

85.0

26.0

19.3

18.9

.84.8

88.7

30.1

NA

Public Service Co Of
NH

83.8

24.2

17.8

15.2

General Public Utils
Corp

83.8

23.3

16.2

28.7

82.1

28.1

16.9

31.9

Central Hudson Gas &
Elec Corp

81.6

28.4

21.6

21.9

Northeast Utilities

80.9

39.7

25.8

27

Pinnacle West Capital
Corp

80.4

19.8

14.3

25.1

New York St Elec &
Gas Corp

80.1

20.6

15.6

25.7

New England Elec
System

80.0

33.6

23.1

17.7

P E C 0 Energy Co

78.3

33.4

19.2

19.6

Eastern Utilities
Associaties

77.8

29.3

21.6

22.8

DQE

76.3

21.0

16.3

36.8

Detroit Edison Co

75.5

20.5

16.2

1,837A

Ohio Edison Co

74.9

19.8

14.3

47.3

TNP Enterprises Inc

73.9

23.4

20.1

NA

Unicorn Corp Holding
Co

73.4

34.7

26.0

19.6

Sierra Pacific
Resources

73.3

27.3

23.4

NA

Centerior Energy Corp
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Commonwealth
Energy Sys

59.8

28.7

23.1

Green Mountain
Power Corp

54.0

55.6

35.8

El Paso Elec Co

48.0

25.2

19.8

Central Vermont
Public Service Corp

55.6

66.5

42.9

41.2

24.0

20.0

Power Co

37.7

24.6

197.7

F P L Group Inc

38.1

25.2

21.3

Tucson Electric Power
Co

33.0

21.1

T E C 0 Energy Inc

27.8

22.9

DPLInc

18.2

13.8

40.9

23.6

17.9

36.7

23.7

17.3

23.9

17.1

Nevada Power Co

22.7

15.7

Black Hills Corp

18.5

11.2

CMS Energy Corp

20.6

16.2

Dominion Resources
Inc

19.6

15.3

Texas Utilities Co

21.5

18.0

22.3

17.7

Florida Progress Corp
Potomac Electric

Public Service Co NM
Pennsylvania Power &

Light Co
NIPSCO Industries Inc

Carolina Power &
Light Co

63.1

36.7

Winter 1997]

STRANDED COST RECOVERY

Utilicorp United Inc

37.8

19.5

13.5

NA

Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co

34.1

21.7

16.3

19

Houston
Industries Inc

34.4

20.7

16.7

21.1

Northwestern Public
Service Co

0.2

0.2

10.5

NA

Delmarva Power &
Light Co

36.2

27.0

19.8

26

Public Service Co of
CO

41.0

16.1

12.0

NA

Madison Gas &
Electric Co

34.4

20.8

14.3

20.3

Northern States Power
Co MN

36.8

17.8

12.6

14.9

Central Louisiana Elec
Inc

33.3

21.8

19.2

NA

Duke Power

35.5

20.0

15.6

16.1

Western
Resources Inc

27.5

19.2

13.3

14.5

Oklahoma Gas &
Electric Co

37.7

18.7

16.1

NA

31.9

14.2

10.5

43.8

MDU Resources
Group Inc

35.1

18.2

12.2

NA

Entergy Corp New

35.5

25.1

21.6

18.5

Puget Sound Power &
Light Co

31.8

13.8

7.6

NA

Southern Co

30.6

22.5

17.7

15.5

Midamerican Energy
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Central Maine Power
Co

52.3

25.5

Union Electric Co

18.7

13.1

CilCorp Inc

21.8

17.2

Kansas City Power &
Light Co

14.5

9.9

Wisconsin
Energy Corp

18.4

13.7

Central & South West
Corp

22.0

19.6

IES Industries Inc

15.6

12.1

SCANA Group

18.3

15.9

CIPSCO Inc

23.7

17.5

IPALCO
Enterprises Inc

16.3

11.8

Allegheny Power
Systems Inc

33.3

18.7

14.0

Portland
General Group

28.4

16.1

11.5

Interstate Power Co

33.1

22.1

18.3

Cincinnati Gas &
Electric Co

29.3

18.1

14.4

WPL Holdings Inc

29.2

17.8

14.6

St Joseph Light &
Power Co

26.5

16.6

14.8

Empire District
Electric Co

28.4

14.6

11.4

27.6

20.8

15.2

Southern Indiana Gas
& Elec Co

46.9

Winter 1997]

STRANDED COST RECOVERY

Otter Tail
Power Co

15.9

11.7

WPS Resources
Holding Co

20.3

14.3

LG&E
Energy Corp

17.5

12.1

PACIFICCORP

13.9

10.0

Washington Water
Power Co

15.8

11.3

Montana
Power Co

18.3

7.6

Illinova Corp Holding
Co

18.1

13.7

26.14

19.9

18.0

NA

Minnesota Power &
Light Co

25.5

16.7

12.6

NA

American Electric
Power Inc

26.4

19.0

14.5

25.4

Idaho Power Co

21.4

17.7

13.1

NA

KU Energy Corp

34A

14.2

11.0

NA

Southwestern Public
Service Co

40.8

Notes: Units in dollars per megawatthour.Upper PeninsulaEnergy and ESELCO are
omitted because of missing data. HawaiianElectricIndustries is excluded because it is
not interconnected. Dataarefrom FERC Form I as availablefrom the Energy
InformationAdministrationof the U.S. Department of Energy.
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Table 4
Current Electricity Generation and Extra Generation Available
From Full Capacity Utilization
Full Capacity
Ulitlization

Current
Generation
Total
From All

Conven- Capacity
Utilitional

Additional

Sources

Steam

zation

Power

Percentage
Increase

Systems Inc

38,785

38,959

63.1%

5,040

13.0%

American Electic
Power Inc

137,675

127,417

61.6%

20,591

15.0%

Atlantic
Energy Inc NJ

5,430

2,853

46.2%

1,571

28.9%

Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co

29,705

17,125

50.6%

7,120

24.0%

Electric Co

216

34

9.5%

221

102.3%

Black Hills Corp

1,109

1,103

86.0/

0

0.0%

Boston Edison Co

9,429

5,5%

36.3%

5,439

54.7/

CIPSCO Inc

11,224

11,224

47.5%

5,708

50.9%

CMS Energy Corp

22,785

17,799

53.8%

5,525

24.2%

Carolina
Power & Light Co

40,462

21,001

49.2%

9,547

23.6%

Centerior
Energy Corp

29,795

18,136

51.1%

7,155

24.0%

Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp

3,782

2,937

37.9/

2,559

67.6/

Central Louisiana
Electric Inc

6,234

6,233

45.8%

3,517

56.4/

utility
Allegheny Power

Bangor Hydro

Winter 1997]
Central
Maine Power
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17,151

534

7.7/

4,435

25.9%

382

25

18.9%

71

18.5%

Central & South
West Corp

57,827

54,195

50.6%

22,490

38.9%

CilCorp Inc

5,675

5,674

58.6%

1,263

22.2%

Cincinnati Gas &
Electric Co

5030

49,821

60.0%

9,665

19.2%

Citizens Utilities Co

327

50

57.5%

12

3.8%

Commonwealth
Energy Co

3,984

3,762

44.1%

2,342

58.8%

Consolidated
Edison Co NY Inc

20,420

12,397

28.4%

18,900

92.6%0

DPL Inc

14,510

14,483

58.5%

3,239

22.3%

DQE

15,436

11,217

55.8%

3,163

20.5%

Delmarva Power &
Light Co

11,582

7,740

50.8%

3,158

27.3%

Detroit Edison Co

42,440

42,890

69.9%

986

2.3/

Dominion
Resources Inc

53,649

27,163

52.5%

9,493

17.7%

Duke Power Co

70,362

32,714

48.3%

15,229

21.6%

Eastern Utilities
Association

3,034

1,716

60.2%

326

10.8%

Edison International

54,023

31,864

42.7/

21,472

39.7/

El Paso Elec Co

7,018

3,367

56.6%

894

12.7%

Empire District
Electric Co

2,630

2,495

76.6%

0

0.0%

ENOVA Corp

7,746

4,042

24.9%

7,571

97.7%

Central Vermont
Public Service Corp
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Entergy Corp NEW

89,068

54,992

37.4%

50,225

56.4%

FPL Group Inc

66,733

31,676

47.0/

16,618

24.9%

78

56

31.6%

71

91.6/

Florida
Progress Corp

24,740

18,838

51.9%

7,127

28.8%

General Public
Utilities Corp

29,152

16,919

55.7/6

4,715

16.2%

16

18.9%

44

28.8%

Fitchburg Gas &
Elec Light Co

Green Mountain
Power Corp
Houston
Industries Inc

53,895

48,104

46.2%

26,478

49.1%

IES Industries Inc

8,407

5,509

69.3%

187

2.2%

Idaho Power Co

13,435

7,222

83.0%

0

0.0%

Holding Co

26,835

20,397

45.3%

11,816

44.0%

Interstate Power Co

3,411

3,409

34.6%

3,640

106.7%

IPALCO
Enterprises Inc

13,580

1,356

66.0%

1,154

8.5%

KU Energy Corp

15,525

15,417

59.9%

3,024

19.5%

& Light Co

16,159

12,150

65.4%

1,144

7.1%

LG&E Energy Corp

12,229

11,894

71.5%

15

0.1%

Long Island LTG Co

10,034

8,365

35.2%

8,638

86.1%

MDU Resources
Group Inc.

1,901

1,890

62.0%

292

15.4%

Madison Gas &
Electric Co,

2,252

1,534

48.1%

750

33.3%

24

19

5.8%

207

879.4%

Illinova Corp

Kansas City Power

Maine Public
Service Co

Winter 1997]
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MidAmerican
Energy

15,183

13,644

72-7%

0

0.0%

Minnesota Power &
Light Co

6,251

5,557

60.8%

990

15.8%

Montana Power Co

9,550

6,550

78.2/

0

0.0%0

NIPSCO
Industries Inc

14,485

14,400

51.7%

5,541

38.3%

Nevada Power Co

6,482

560

351.2/

2,238

34.5%

New England
Electric Sys

13,900

10,972

53.1%

3,640

26.2/

New York St
Electric & Gas Corp

16,169

14,338

77.6%

0

0.0%

Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp

19,681

8,728

27.1%

14,171

72.0%

Northeast Utilities

19,735

3,631

25.2%

6,192

31.4%

Northern States
Power Co MN

33,632

20,431

60.6/

3,690

11.0/

Northwestern
Public Service Co

1,236

1,233

66.3/

99

8.0%

Ohio Edison Co

31,319

23,870

64.1%

2,790

8.9%

Oklahoma Gas &
Electric Co

18,326

17,891

37.1%

16,633

90.8%

Orange & Rockland
Utilities Inc

3,410

3,282

66.8%

232

6.8%

Otter Tail Power Co

2,832

2,805

57.8%

668

23.6%

PECO Energy Co

40,851

11,240

46.6%

5,722

14.0%

Pacific Gas &
Electric Co

58,158

35,557

69.2/

1,244

2.1%

PACIFICORP

54,928

51,644

85.9/

0

0.0%
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Pennsylania Power
& Light Co

37,874

23,301

46.7%

12,429

32.8%

Pinnacle West
Capitol Corp

19,932

12,377

63.6%

1,556

7.8%

Portland General
Corp

9,706

4,918

84.8%

0

0.0%

Potomac Electric
Power Co

19,320

18,803

44.6%

11,392

59.0%

Public Service
Co of CO

16,093

15,950

67.5%

955

5.9%

Public Service
Co of NM

8,457

6,101

60.2%

1,155

13.7%

Public Service
Co of NH

5,252

4,661

57.9%

1,105

21.0%

Public Service
Enterprise Group

29,747

10,833

29.1%

15,554

52.3%

Puget Sound Power
& Light Co

7,012

5,527

75.4%

0

0.0%

Rochester Gas &
Electric Corp

6,097

1,478

31.4%

1,781

29.2%

SCANA Corp

16,986

13,705

71.4%

43

0.3%

Sierra Pacific
Resources

3,895

3,835

55.9%

1,079

27.7%

Southern Co

141,551

106,617

56.7%

27,978

19.8%

Southern Indiana
Gas & Electric Co

5,435

5,409

54.6%

1,687

31.0%

Southwestern Public
Service Co

21,415

21,270

63.7%

2,623

12.3%

St Joseph Light &
Power Co

1,166

1,160

45.7N

655

56.2%

TECO Energy Inc

16,103

16,071

59.70/

3,214

20.0%

Winter 1997]
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TNP Enterprises Inc

2,337

2,337

83.8%

0

0.0%

Texas Utilities Co

81,321

66,M385

49.0/

30,574

37.6/

Tuscon Electric
Power Co

10,167

10,159

6.6%

920

9.1%

UNICOM Corp
Holding Co

90,243

26,361

31.2/

34,088

37.8%

Union Electric Co

33,662

21,921

47.6/

11,001

32.7/

United Mum Co

4,947

3,513

59.0%/

750

15.2%

UtiliCorp United Inc

5,660

5,626

51.1%

2,258

39.9%

WPL Holdings Inc

9,698

7,821

96.3%

0

0.0%

WPS Resources
Group Holding Co

9,014

7,048

60.71o

1,266

14.0/

Washington Water
Power Co

6,331

3,400 ,

83.2/

0

0.0%

Western
Resources Inc

20,562

16,532

53.6%

5,570

27.1%

Wisconsin Energy
Corp

26,429

18,328

58.0%

4,288

16.2%

Notes: Dataare taken from Forms 860 and 759 availablefrom the Energy Information
Administrationof the U.S. Departmentof Energy.
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Table 5
Forecast of Fair Market Value (FMV) and True Stranded Costs
Estimated Total Stranded Costs
Forecast
FMV of

$41,988,598

Long Term Forecast
Equity
Debt

Value

Utility

Book
Value of

Estimated
Stranded

Utility

Costs

Assets

Assets

utility ,
Allegheny Power
Systems Inc

8,789,815

1,938,306

71,605.62

4,361,691

0

17,013,174

4,875,401

13,563,295

1,100,574

0

1,162,729

765,130

468,064

1,781,923

619,194

7,235,474

2,306,342

5,277,018

5,531,371

0

Bangor Hydro
Electric Co

267,981

117,828

156,009

218,741

0

Black Hills Corp

230,055

131,061

98,994

309,191

79,136

Boston Edison Co

2,906,732

12,842

2,397,830

2,796,778

0

CIPSCO Inc

2,367,504

474,620

1,894,139

1,426,804

0

CMS Energy Corp

5,979,917

1,918,098

4,238,903

4,197,983

0

9,429,862

2,805,823

6,693,528

6,349,484

0

Energy Corp

4,964,876

4,014,502

1,250,423

6,986,637

2,021,761

Central Hudson
Gas & Electric
Corp

1,733,667

388,048

1,345,619

931,073

0

American
Electic Power
Inc
Atlantic
Energy Inc NJ

Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co

Carolina
Power & Light Co

Centerior
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Central Louisiana
Electric Inc

1,299,777

349,955

949,822

911,678

Central
Maine Power

4,938,652

1,182,187

5,244,589

1,601,260

893,575

177,044

716,531

391,940

Central & South
West Corp

9,833,026

2,854,022

7,542,314

7,352,503

CilCorp Inc

1,101,700

278,359

832,230

867,050

Cincinnati Gas &
Electric Co

8,84,683

2,774,887

6,676,624

6,188,419

Citizens Utilities
Co

0

942,258

(912,190)

1,106,336

1,106,336

Commonwealth
Energy Co

1,675,581

289,879

1,497,705

730,974

0

Consolidated
Edison Co NY Inc

3,428,560

4,041,353

(612,793)

10,548656

7,120,096

DPL Inc

3,720,962

1,001,019

2,878,25

2Z29,523

0

DQE

3,103,794

1,428,528

3,477,096

3,049,721

0

Delmarva Power
& Light Co

2,303,258

834,137

1,469,121

2,046,997

0

Detroit Edison Co

7,393,510

3,806,910

5,565,167

8,879581

1,486,071

Dominion
Resources Inc

13,306,141

4,222,674

9,679,178

9651,096

0

Duke Power Co

14682,272

3,541,152

11,486,702

9,296,741

0

Eastern Utilities
Association

1,321,956

498,391

840,091

815,200

0

Edison
International

9,558,489

5,189,253

4,369,236

12,416,547

2,88,058

Central Vermont
Public Service
Corp
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El Paso Elec Co

654,574

0

1,080,420

1,183,414

528,840

Empire District
Electric Co

433,093

185,067

270,743

445835

12,743

ENOVA Corp

2,818,259

1,234,254

1,584,035

3,149,092

330,803

Entergy Corp
NEW

20,513,454

760,795

18,622,857

1,525,876

0

FPL Group Inc

13,829,782

3,667,507

1,413,861

1,006,153

0

47,718

34,000

13,718

63,395

15,677

Florida
Progress Corp

4,372,555

1,399,183

3,167,172

3,669,252

0

General Public
Utilities Corp

7,041,773

2,767,151

4,274,622

6,207,036

0

81,797

79,800

11,104

175,987

94,191

Houston
Industries Inc

12,771,121

3,176,612

9,735,755

8,976,028

0

IES Industries Inc

2,015,014

480,544

1,947,536

1,278,077

0

Idaho Power Co

1,361,942

693,723

668,218

1,654,890

292,948

Ulinova Corp
Holding Co

6,678,650

1,998,158

5,134,307

4,727,168

0

Interstate Power
Co

847,304

202,917

747,719

500,681

0

IPALCO
Enterprises Inc

2,465,485

654,121

1,811,364

1,711,772

0

KU Energy Corp

1,712,503

496,033

1,219,891

1,409,917

0

Kansas City
Power & Light Co

3,709,919

780,518

3,196,322

2,336,142

0

LG&E Energy
Corp

1,697,509

662,862

1,59,5

1,53,894

0

Fitchburg Gas &
Elec Light Co

Green Mountain
Power Corp

Winter 1997]
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Long Island LTG
Co

1,656,862

5,170,397

(1,748,832)

3,497,591

1,840,729

MDU Resources
Group Inc.

496,189

202,293

314,438

350,224

0

Madison Gas &
Electric Co

509,997

139,320

370,677

336,989

0

Maine Public
Service Co

105,856

37,500

88,549

45,663

0

MidAmerican
Energy

3,096,315

1,231,813

2,349,062

2,645,159

0

Minnesota Power
& Light Co

1,187,724

433,395

755,641

769,600

0

Montana Power
Co

1,363,591

587,660

932,065

1,391,247

27,656

NIPSCO
Industries Inc

3,463,046

1,088,537

2,565,914

3,107,569

0

Nevada Power Co

1,341,073

612,298

728,775

1,584,003

242,929

New England
Electric Sys

5,769,037

1,390,744

4,957,665

3,755,551

0

New York St Elec
& Gas Corp

3,677,992

1,620,083

2,506,509

3,979,252

301,260

Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp

8,466,769

3,331,531

5,155,868

7,008,545

0

Northeast Utilities

4,944,476

2,619,177

4,646,226

5,487,355

542,879

Northern States
Power Co MN

7,425,252

1,484,778

6,167,412

4,230,554

0

Northwestern
Public Service Co

239,995

123,850

116,145

242,286

2,291

Ohio Edison Co

5,409,754

3,236,249

2,300,013

5,800,088

390,334
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Oklahoma Gas &
Electric Co

5,179,346

749,017

4,780,395

2,042,W6

0

S86,093

370,478

521,719

850,392

264,299

Otter Tail Power
Co

823,274

140,558

689,069

432,543

0

PECO Energy Co

8,167,367

5,228,052

3,631,035

10,834,490

2,667,123

Pacific Gas &
Electric Co

6,190,717

8,336,989

(1,899,63N)

18,481,153

12,290,436

PACIFICORP

10,386,407

3,186,342

7,207,793

7,474,088

0

Pennsylania
Power & Light Co

10,056,827

2,940,789

7,238,154

7,126,676

0

Pinnacle West
Capitol Corp

3,950.334

2,174,732

2,049,251

4,624,073

673,739

Portland General
Corp

2,666,433

874,153

2,059,348

1,690,892

0

Potomac Electric
Power Co

4,461,563

1,768,844

3,666,973

4,291,295

0

Public Service
Co of CO

3,901,912

1,111,242

3,934,179

3,173,986

0

Public Service
Co of NM

1,268,709

900,595

400,844

1,666,458

397,750

Public Service
Co of NH

2,006,290

999,985

1,441,482

701,716

0

Public Service
Enterprise Group

8,317,875

4,951,627

3,375,785

10,936,244

2,618,369

Puget Sound
Power & Light Co

3,735,413

1,071,298

2,748,385

2,266,911

0

Rochester Gas &
Electric Corp

1,908,327

735,178

1,758,161

1,696,055

0

Orange &
Rockland Utilities
Inc

Winter 1997]
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SCANA Corp

2,962,616

1,356,790

1,967,072

3,168,017

205,401

Sierra Pacific
Resources

805,775

521,216

322,049

1,331,478

525,703

Southern Co

27,905,711

7,239,314

21,783,672

20,070,515

0

Southern Indiana
Gas & Electric Co

705,619

296,359

448,889

677,936

0

Southwestern
Public Service Co

2,241,130

522,341

1,738,018

1,518,085

0

St Joseph Light &
Power Co

282,440

53,100

231,304

148,248

0

TECO Energy Inc

2,302,365

608,530

2,238,361

1,985,162

0

TNP Enterprises
Inc

992,952

685,502

312,319

967,273

0

Texas Utilities Co

19,904,351

7,276,678

12,700,499

18,297,962

0

Tuscon Electric
Power Co

1,019,000

1,398,950

(377,240)

1,820,783

801,783

UNICOM Corp
Holding Co

20,072,192

8,161,725

13,189,755

17,016,541

0

Union Electric Co

9,244,960

1,773,451

7,471,509

5,320,852

0

United Ilium Co

918,271

901,473

54,993

1,357,258

438,987

UtiliCorp United
Inc

1,355,203

770,295

701,741

1,463,565

108,361

WPL Holdings
Inc

1,652,292

336,538

1,345,629

1,200,080

0

WPS Resources
Group Hold Co

1,489,942

316,121

1,262,016

799,606

0

Washington
Water Power Co

425,956

709,982

(284,026)

1,329,045

903,089

Western
Resources Inc

4,114,490

1,656,455

4,118,348

4,294,115

179,625

120
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Wisconsin Energy
Corp

5,826,145

1,167,408

4,658,738

2,692,700

0

Notes: Forecastequity value includes cashflows from subsidiaries. Amounts are in
thousands. Source, see note, Table 2.
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Table 6
Yields on Government and Electric Utility Bonds
Overall Electric Utility
Bond Yields

Government
Bond Yield

December 1990

9.58%

8.28%

1.30%

December 1989

9.33%

7.99%

1.34%

December 1988

10.09%

9.10%

.99%

December 1987

10.91%

9.20%

1.71%

December 1986

9.00%

7.68%

1.32%

December 1985

10.56%

10.18%

.38%

Date

Difference

Sources: StatisticalYearbook of the ElectricUtility Industry/1990, Edison ElectricInstitute,
page 92 and Federal Reserve Electronic Database, Internet, Long-Term Government
Securities,Excludingflower Bonds.
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Figure 1

Unit Charge Recovery of Stranded Costs
P
Marginal Cost
+ Unit Recovery
Charges
PR
PC
CR

cof

C

I

I

qR

qc

Pc - Price Under Competition
q c - Quantity Under Competition
r - Unit Recovery Fee
PR - Price with Recovery
roqR- Amount of Stranded Cost Recovery
CR - Cost of Electricity Excluding Recovery

Marginal Cost
Supplying
Electricity

Demand for
Electricity
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Figure 2

P

Two-Part Tariff Recovery of Stranded Costs

Marginal Cost of Power

Demand for Power

I

q

